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Nearly every one of the promises that were made by 
the architects and creators of liberalism has been shat-
tered. The liberal state expands to control nearly every 
aspect of life while citizens regard government as a dis-
tant and uncontrollable power, one that only extends 
their sense of powerlessness by relentlessly advancing 
the project of ‘globalization.’ The only rights that seem 
secure today belong to those with sufficient wealth 
and position to protect them, and their autonomy … is 
increasingly compromised by legal intent or technologi-
cal fait accompli.
But the solution isn’t more liberalism, institutional tinker-
ing, or reforms to our political system, Deneen says. Our 
present problems don’t stem from a failure to live up to 
liberal ideals. Rather, in some strange dialectic, liberal-
ism “has failed because it has succeeded”—its disastrous 
effects spring from its central ideology. They are the 
system’s features, not its bugs. “To call for the cures of 
liberalism’s ills by applying more liberal measures,” he 
argues, “is tantamount to throwing gas on a raging fire.”
WHAT DENEEN SETS OUT TO ARGUE is that the political philo- 
sophy underlying American politics is utterly bankrupt. 
This diagnosis, and most importantly its timing, is why 
the book has received such broad attention. Very little 
is truly new here, and Deneen mainly rehashes critiques 
that Catholic conservatives have offered for decades, 
perhaps most notably in Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue.  
Even so, Why Liberalism Failed offers a bold critique 
of contemporary American society and the ideas that 
underpin it.
The breadth of Deneen’s critique—with chapters analyz-
ing everything from politics and economics to educa-
tion and science and technology—comes at the cost of 
nuance, but it also means that there is something for 
everyone. Deneen has received praise from across the 
ideological spectrum, including from Cornel West, who 
called the book “courageous and timely” in light of “the 
rude awakening of the Trump moment,” adding that “if 
we remain tied to liberalism’s failure, more inequality, 
repression, and spiritual emptiness await us.” The diag-
nosis proposed in Why Liberalism Failed has also reso-
nated with the right. Both David Brooks and Ross Douthat 
have written appreciative op-eds in The New York Times, 
and Gene Callahan has called the book “vitally important 
for understanding the present crisis of Western politics” 
in the pages of The American Conservative.
The effect for most readers, liberal or conservative, must 
be simultaneous approval and scepticism. Deneen is crit-
ical of laissez-faire economics and a reliance on market 
mechanisms, and points to income inequality, climate 
change, resource depletion, groundwater contamination, 
and species extinction as evidence of liberalism’s failure. 
Yet he’s also critical of secularism and “infinitely fluid 
sexual identity,” and sees declining birth rates and rising 
divorce rates as signs of cultural crisis. His comments 
on feminism offer an example: he approvingly cites the 
Marxist feminist theorist Nancy Fraser to comment on 
the exploitation of women in the “workforce of market 
capitalism,” but then ultimately suggests that they might 
have been better off if they had never entered the work-
force at all.
Why Liberalism Failed is a call for deep pessimism both 
about our current world and the achievements of moder-
nity. While it appeals to sceptics of all stripes, not all are 
convinced by the apparent signs of decay. Interestingly, 
another strain of argument has appeared alongside it in 
the Trump era—one that seeks to reassure us that every- 
thing is totally fine. Why Liberalism Failed is, in effect, 
the direct antithesis of Stephen Pinker’s new book Enlight- 
enment Now, which claims that human beings are now  
flourishing. Pinker argues that human beings are health- 
ier, richer, and better educated than ever before, and 
proposes that these advances are a direct result of the 
Enlightenment itself. Where Deneen claims that the ideas  
of the “Age of Revolutions” have failed, Pinker writes 
TWO TRUTHS EXIST IN UNEASY TENSION: liberalism has tri-
umphed over its opponents, and liberalism is in mortal 
decay. Under the first, we inhabit the so-called “end of 
history,” where liberalism—with its focus on the rights and 
freedoms of the individual—has felled its main compet-
itors, communism and fascism. Look around the world 
and we see liberal regimes, justified in liberal terms. Pax 
Liberalis, thy kingdom hath come.
Under the second, liberalism’s fate hangs in the balance. 
The resurgence of illiberalism across Europe points to 
a profound unease with the status quo. In America, a 
political revolt against liberal elites yielded Donald J. 
Trump. Defenders of liberalism find themselves forced 
to acknowledge the disenchantment of the “other half,” 
those disadvantaged by neoliberal economics and 
regarded contemptuously by the cultural elite of the coasts. 
Bellum Americanum.
How can we make sense of these competing truths? 
Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed claims to offer 
both an explanation and a call to action. He argues  
that both statements above are true: liberalism has failed 
precisely because it has succeeded. Though the book was  
completed immediately before the 2016 American elec-
tion, it helps us understand what has happened since. 
Deneen calls liberalism the oldest and last major mod-
ern ideology to have “proposed transforming all aspects 
of human life to conform to a preconceived plan.” But 
where the others have failed, liberalism has succeeded, 
shaping our modern culture, politics, and society. For 
Deneen, a professor of political science at Notre Dame, 
liberalism is essentially a 500-year-old wager that the 
world would improve if we re-ordered our politics.
Liberalism proposed that we conceive of humans as 
rights-bearing individuals who could fashion and pur-
sue their own versions of the good life. This would be 
best achieved by a free-market economic system and a 
limited government legitimated by free-and-fair elections.  
Yet something has gone awry:
5
triumphantly that “the Enlightenment has worked.”* Where  
Pinker notes that economic growth has skyrocketed, 
Deneen highlights that wealth is concentrated in the hands  
of the one-percent. Where Pinker argues that the scien- 
tific revolution has drastically improved our quality of 
life, Deneen points out that this has come at the cost 
of environmental degradation that now threatens the 
existence of the species. Pinker claims that progress has 
materialized because people are free to get what they 
want. Deneen denies that freedom consists in an abun-
dance of lifestyle choices.
What Pinker and Deneen have in common, however, is the 
all-or-nothing approach they take to their topics. Pinker 
refuses to acknowledge the idea that some things have 
gotten better while others have gotten worse; his exag-
gerated optimism leads him to dismiss any potential 
reservations about progress as trivial. Likewise, Deneen 
ignores the elements of liberalism that made it initially 
appealing. And when he does acknowledge those better 
elements—constitutionalism, limited government, indi-
vidual rights—he claims that they in fact predate liberal-
ism and can outlast it: “protection of rights of individuals 
and the belief in inviolable human dignity, if not always 
consistently recognized and practiced, were neverthe-
less philosophical achievements of premodern medieval 
Europe.” We can have our cake and eat it too.
At their root, both stories rest on secularized forms of 
Christian faith—either a faith in progress and the realiza- 
tion of God’s design, or a conviction that what we have 
witnessed is the fall of man. Nonetheless, Deneen’s argu-
ment explains much more than Pinker’s. Deneen offers 
a philosophy of history that explains not only why things 
have gotten so bad, but why they are bound to get worse: 
liberalism can never succeed because its underlying 
assumptions and ideas are ill-conceived. While Pinker 
gives a wealth of statistics proving how great things are, 
these provide no guarantee that things will continue that  
way. Because it fails to address the possibility of increased  
bloodshed, inequality, social disintegration, and climate 
catastrophe, his argument is unlikely to persuade anyone 
who doesn’t already believe the Leibnizian mantra that 
we live in the best of all possible worlds.
OF COURSE, Deneen doesn’t actually believe that liber-
alism has failed. It has not collapsed, which is why 
Deneen feels compelled to deal it a death blow. In fact, 
he indicates that without any intervention it is possible 
that liberalism could continue for quite some time. In 
his view, things could get much worse, and he indulges 
in speculation of a future “deep state” imposing liberal 
order by fiat despite a lack of popular support. This is 
why, perhaps counterintuitively, Deneen so forcefully 
tries to convince readers to reject liberalism.
He has two main arguments. First, while liberalism pres-
ents itself as a neutral system, it has actually sought to 
remake the world in its own image. It was founded on a  
THE BREADTH OF DENEEN’S CRITIQUE—WITH  
CHAPTERS ANALYZING EVERYTHING FROM 
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS TO EDUCATION 
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—COMES AT 
THE COST OF NUANCE, BUT IT ALSO MEANS 
THAT THERE IS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE.
reinterpretation—indeed, a whole new definition—of liberty 
and of the human person. Deneen bemoans the fact that 
while freedom for the pre-moderns meant virtue and the  
capacity for self-government, freedom now means liber-
ation from all arbitrariness that determines us without 
our choosing—including liberation from authority, culture, 
tradition, and nature. Human beings are defined as funda- 
mentally autonomous creatures, animals driven above  
all by self-interest. One consequence of this is that all  
human relationships—familial, neighborly, communal, 
and religious—are only legitimate if they are freely 
chosen. As a result, liberalism “teaches people to hedge 
commitments and adopt flexible relationships and bonds”  
and ultimately destroys the forms of unchosen attachment  
that hold communities together. Liberalism appeared to 
work for so long because it relied on pre-liberal re- 
sources to maintain a moral and cultural consensus, but  
over time it wore away these bonds without being able 
to replenish or replace them. Deneen holds that market 
mechanisms only function when local customs and cul-
tures check the selfish desires of individual actors. What 
we are witnessing now is the triumph of depersonalized 
market relationships and the decline of any checks on 
corporate greed. Without these norms, the state enters 
to forcibly sustain order. All that is not restrained by law 
is permitted, rendering law the only tool that remains to 
guide conduct. In the absence of behavioural standards, 
Deneen claims, the only body that can combat the con-
flicts that arise is the state.
This leads to Deneen’s surprising next point: individual-
ism and statism actually depend upon and reinforce one 
another. Having shorn communal and institutional ties 
that once offered sustenance, people are forced to turn 
to the state in times of need. Deneen views the main 
political options in the United States, embodied by the 
orthodoxy of the Democratic and Republican parties, as 
two sides of the same ideological coin —as merely two 
different forms of liberalism. He heaps scorn on both the 
Left and the Right. While so-called conservatives express 
hostility towards state expansion, they consistently turn 
to the state in order to create “free markets” and destroy 
all traditional norms that might prevent the market’s 
penetration into the life of a community. Like Bernard 
Harcourt’s The Illusion of Free Markets, he demonstrates 
that the market is a political creation that always required 
political and administrative regulation. In reality, today’s 
conservatives—from Paul Ryan to John Bolton—are classi- 
cal liberals. And while progressives claim that an expan-
sive state is the ultimate protector of individual liberty, 
Deneen notes that they seek to limit the role of the state  
when it comes to personal and sexual autonomy. Ulti-
mately, both camps only further contribute to individual 
fragmentation, and both fail to address deregulation, 
globalization, and soaring economic inequalities. For all 
Americans who celebrate choice, political options in the 
Land of the Free start to seem meager.
IF LIBERALISM HAS FAILED, Deneen suggests that one 
possible outcome is to replace it with another system. 
So what comes after liberalism? His solution is a form of 
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localism, focused on sustaining culture within communi-
ties, fostering “household economics,” and creating forms 
of self-governance that include greater civic participa-
tion. Deneen proposes that we return to the land, grow 
our own food, and find small communities of like-minded 
others. In short, we should live like the Amish. It’s ultimate- 
ly just a nominally secular version of what Rod Dreher 
calls “the Benedict option,” a social opt-out for Christians 
to maintain their faith by forming intentional communi-
ties and removing themselves from mainstream society.
Following such a forceful critique of the Western social 
order, Deneen’s alternative is underwhelming. But perhaps 
that’s the point. Deneen wants to avoid giving us a pre-
scription. He evinces a profound scepticism of any pure 
theory that claims to tell us how to live, and instead seeks  
forms of life that originate in the creation of new tradi-
tions. “The impulse to devise a new and better political 
theory in the wake of liberalism’s simultaneous triumph 
and demise is a temptation that must be resisted,” he 
writes. “The search for a comprehensive theory is what 
gave rise to liberalism and successor ideologies in the 
first place.” Instead, what we need is not a better theory 
but better praxis.
And yet for someone so adamant about escaping the 
clutches of ideology, Deneen imputes a great deal of 
agency to liberalism. In Why Liberalism Failed, it is liber- 
alism—and not any particular writers, politicians, or social 
reformers—that drives history. Deneen writes as though 
liberalism has its own beliefs, executes its own plans, 
and takes its own actions. We are all liberalism’s victims, 
he claims. But where are its perpetrators?
This is why Why Liberalism Failed fails. Liberalism is not 
an agent. Nor is it a coherent idea with a unified form, 
but rather a series of ideas and political movements that 
evolved over time. Deneen presents its failure as inevi- 
table—a result of its inner contradictions—and makes 
the current moment seem predestined from liberalism’s 
creation. He does this by overstating the importance of 
autonomy as the singularly liberal value, and by collaps-
ing what were historically distinct demands for freedom  
into a single doctrine. In the process, he collapses diverse  
thinkers into a single monolithic progression from the past  
to the present. He believes, rather anachronistically, that 
thinkers ranging from Luther and Hobbes to Machiavelli 
and Rousseau were all working to establish liberalism, an 
idea which would have been foreign—if not outrageous—to 
most of them. Freedom from religious persecution, from  
foreign domination, and from arbitrary rule are all dis-
tinct demands. While later demands for freedom built 
upon the successes of earlier struggles, our current world 
was not determined at the outset of modernity.
* Stephen Pinker, Enlightenment Now. (Viking, 2018).
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MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, popular culture suggests, is gray, 
cold, and orderly. Its abuses of power take place on well- 
paved roads in uniformly dense cities containing only 
right angles. Its grocery stores have only beige foods, and 
its schoolchildren sing songs in high-pitched horror- 
movie unison. Its marching policemen all lift their knees 
to the same height. Gardens, parks, backyards, and topi-
ary structures, one would imagine, are low on the state’s 
priority list.
Not so in dictatorial Brazil, where prominent landscape 
architect Roberto Burle Marx spent the thirties to the 
sixties designing tableaux that were part tropical para-
dise, part modernist utopia. His designs draw out striking 
contrasts between the natural and built environment 
by juxtaposing lanky palm trees with refined azulejo 
mosaics, or graceful constructed waterways with desert 
flora. His Parque do Flamengo in Rio de Janeiro looks at 
once like a series of amoebas and a collection of flying 
discs carving clean lines into the bushy green landscape. 
Whimsical though they may be, his designs also repre-
sent an arm of the Brazilian dictatorial state: Burle Marx 
served in the Federal Council of Culture during the coun-
try’s second dictatorship, and many of his works were 
commissioned by top state officials.
Between 1967 and 1974, Burle Marx delivered a series of 
position pieces to the Federal Council of Culture from 
his position as one of the council’s appointees. Catherine 
Seavitt Nordenson, a landscape architect and associate 
professor of architecture at the City College of New York, 
provides original translations and context for the writings  
of Burle Marx in Depositions: Roberto Burle Marx and 
Public Landscapes Under Dictatorship (2018). Though 
readers might come into Depositions familiar with the 
political implications of urban planning or architecture, 
Seavitt Nordenson demonstrates that in Brazil during  
the 1960s, even landscape architecture was political. The 
book’s introduction offers the uninitiated reader a clear  
introduction to the key forces in Brazilian politics of the  
time: the 1964 coup that resulted in a military dictatorship, 
the so-called Brazilian economic miracle of the seventies 
that urbanized the country, and the national desire for 
modernization and progress that fueled massive invest-
ment in infrastructure and development. It was during 
this time that Burle Marx gave his depositions on a vari- 
ety of aesthetic and political issues, from advocacy for 
national park preservation to which architectural flour-
ishes were the ugliest (“sculptures of heroes,” “poorly 
pruned trees”). Despite Burle Marx’s position within a 
brutally repressive state regime, the depositions appeal 
to emotions, common sense, and the law to defy the dic- 
tatorship’s stance on development and endorse the pres-
ervation of Brazil’s flora and fauna.
Seavitt Nordenson fills her text with photographs, render- 
ings, and blueprints of Burle Marx’s work that ask us to 
consider the connection between his visual artistry and 
textual advocacy. Devoid of people, the landscapes could 
just as easily be mockups, yet they are familiar to those 
who have walked through Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, 
or São Paulo. Oh, so that was Burle Marx’s too? With kalei- 
doscopic glasses, I revisit my quotidian familiarity with 
these environments in light of Burle Marx’s vision for them 
as planned and political. In their physical materiality, the 
landscapes are incontrovertible testaments to the fact that 
beyond these orations, something was built. Yet there is 
something outside the gardens’ physicality that haunts. 
As my mind’s eye revisits the shimmering, transforming 
views of the Parque do Flamengo, I wonder whether their 
aesthetics, and indeed their place in my life, can be sep-
arated from the project of their inception. Especially in 
today’s political climate, in which political trials explode 
months before a national election, the gardens are uncom- 
fortable reminders of the dictatorial state.
Through their juxtapositions with the text and with each  
other, Seavitt Nordenson’s curatorial choices in Depositions 
are a collage in their own right. The interplay between 
artistic intent and viewer interpretation gives the volume 
layers—the more it is picked up, leafed through, and put  
down again, the more it reveals meaning. Yet her critical 
commentary on the broader visual culture of Brazil during 
the sixties is often lacking. Offering images of political  
events, Brazilian heads of state, and works by other artists, 
she remarks that the images “reveal what is not said,” but 
refrains from providing her own commentary about what 
is said, or what she might say. She chooses to depict 
Getúlio Vargas, the fourteenth president of Brazil, grin-
ning wildly atop a horse, bearing closer resemblance to a 
child on a show pony than a head of state in an equestrian 
pose. Was this Seavitt Nordenson’s way of conveying der- 
ision for the president-turned-dictator? Or was the image 
simply comical, a tickling gem of the archive she hoped 
would see the light of day? Images like these are as intri- 
guing as they are puzzling.
As a work of translation, Depositions delivers. Seavitt 
Nordenson is an excellent translator: technical terms, 
colloquial language, and idioms flow without a hitch. She 
is also discriminating, careful to translate necessary 
words while not overburdening us with excessive vocabu-
lary. Her work as a translator is particularly vital because 
so few of Burle Marx’s depositions have been translated 
into English, and much of the supplementary material 
she draws upon is only available in Portuguese. More 
importantly, the book helps us reflect on the ideological 
opportunities of translation. Seavitt Nordenson’s desire 
for readers to “take Burle Marx at his word” reveals the 
importance of bringing new angles of engagement to 
our American-centered critique. For example, she points 
out that Burle Marx’s insistence on the compatibility 
between economic development and ecological preser-
vation cannot be derived from the two American schools 
of natural preservation exemplified by John Muir and 
Gifford Pinchot. Burle Marx’s perspective is something  
new entirely, and we would be wise to investigate the 
“union of nature and nationhood” he exemplifies. By 
undertaking the translation project that is Depositions, 
Seavitt Nordenson injects new life into the English-
language discourse on landscape architecture and on 
modernism’s reverberations across the world.
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Yet Depositions is far from a mere translation of Burle 
Marx’s transcribed orations. Seavitt Nordenson provides 
a critical and historical framework with which to inter-
pret his depositions. Precisely because so little of this 
work has been translated, its content is largely unfamil-
iar to non-Portuguese-speaking audiences. The choices 
Seavitt Nordenson makes to contextualize the deposi-
tions thus have a profound role in shaping how the reader 
will view Burle Marx’s work and the history of Brazilian 
state-sponsored architecture more broadly. In that light, 
great responsibility rests on Seavitt Nordenson ’s shoul-
ders, and at times she does not carry through.
One of Seavitt Nordenson’s great strengths is her clarity 
in conveying the history of Brazil’s military dictatorship 
from 1964 to 1985. Her account combines the succinct-
ness of a crash-course textbook with the allure of walking  
through a gallery of Brazil’s notable moments. The nag-
ging question that remains, however, is whether the story  
of the great men of the dictatorship was the right one to  
tell. It is certainly critical to understanding Burle Marx’s 
oeuvre that we consider its historical context and his par- 
ticipation in the project of national progress, even if his 
work aimed to criticize it from within. Seavitt Nordenson 
sells us on the idea that landscape architecture is polit- 
ical insofar as it was done for the great political movers 
and shakers of Brazil. Yet Seavitt Nordenson’s historical 
sketch is the cookie cutter one: she tells us of the mod-
ernist artists like Mário de Andrade and Anita Malfatti, 
the heads of state like Vargas, and all the pertinent elites 
with which Brazilian schools familiarize their students. 
She is often concerned with high art and how Burle Marx 
fits within the small world that was in constant conversa-
tion with European artists and thinkers like Le Corbusier. 
She also emphasizes the precedent for Burle Marx’s work 
in the colonial gardens of the Portuguese court, highlight- 
ing the Europe-Brazil connection as though it were natural  
and inevitable. American scholars tend to believe that if  
Burle Marx’s work, noting that he was more concerned 
with advancing the “culture of the environment” than advo- 
cating for “individual human rights.” Indeed, she notes 
that his decision to work for the military regime was 
“ethically fraught,” but she does not dive into what these 
ethics entail. As readers, we miss the opportunity to 
consider how the utopia of the ecologically-minded elite 
affected the candangos, because the candangos’ history 
and context do not rank high enough on the list of Seavitt 
Nordenson’s concerns. Rather than rewriting the can-
dangos’ history to accompany Burle Marx’s work, Seavitt 
Nordenson replicates the stories of power Brazilians 
already know so that English-speaking audiences can 
participate in its reproduction.
Oddly, in a book dedicated to the designs of Burle Marx, 
we don’t get to know much at all about Burle Marx the 
person. By piecing together details, we determine that 
Burle Marx was safe in his status within Brazil’s white 
intelligentsia. Seavitt Nordenson reveals this in subtle 
ways, like when she notes that he developed close ties 
to people with political power early in his career. Yet 
without a deep investigation of Burle Marx’s background, 
her cross-examination of his work—and its political 
implications—seems lacking. Beyond her gloss on Burle 
Marx’s fraught complicity with the dictatorship, Seavitt 
Nordenson avoids holding Burle Marx accountable for 
how his utopic visions could undermine the interests of 
common people. Burle Marx seems to spend all of his 
time thinking about the distribution of flora and no time 
thinking about the distribution of people, particularly 
indigenous people, who inhabit it. If Burle Marx did not 
consider them, Seavitt Nordenson should have. What 
motivated Burle Marx? Should we read his ecological 
depositions as resistance against the military regime, 
as Seavitt Nordenson suggests, if he hardly challenged 
its oppression? Were there moments of uncertainty, 
guilt, betrayal? An increased emphasis on Burle Marx’s 
ESPECIALLY IN TODAY’S POLITICAL CLIMATE, 
IN WHICH POLITICAL TRIALS EXPLODE 
MONTHS BEFORE A NATIONAL ELECTION, 
THE GARDENS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE 
REMINDERS OF THE DICTATORIAL STATE.
you tell the elite’s story of the Global South, you get the 
story right—Seavitt Nordenson falls squarely into this trap.  
Fixated on the stories that Brazilians in power already 
tell, she misses the opportunity to elaborate on another 
way in which landscape architecture is political: the way 
it moves and shapes the non-elites.
In some moments, this angle emerges. Seavitt Nordenson 
remarks that the plan for the zoo botanical garden in 
Brasília would have displaced people in Candangolândia, 
a settlement for workers brought in to build the city. She 
also points out Burle Marx’s grappling with how his land-
scapes might bulldoze over favelas. Yet Seavitt Nordenson 
fails to mention that the candangos after whom Candan-
golândia is named were primarily black and brown, usu-
ally the poorest residents of the adjacent states willing 
to do itinerant work for the wealthy bureaucrats who 
envisioned a utopic city. Upon the completion of Brazil’s 
capital, the candangos were expected either to return to 
their former homes or to live in satellite cities far from 
the main metropolis. In short, the candangos were envi-
sioned from the start as a disposable labor force that 
would not participate in the project their labor helped 
create. Seavitt Nordenson acknowledges this tension in 
biography and the effect of his landscapes on the non-
elites might have brought us to the final way in which 
landscape architecture is political: it is political only 
insofar as it is personal.
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THE BACK COVER OF TERRY EAGLETON’S RADICAL SACRIFICE 
bills the book as an “analysis of sacrifice as the founda-
tion of the modern, as well as the ancient, social order.” 
This is an exciting proposition for exploration, with the  
potential to provide a new way of conceptualizing what 
religion can offer to our understandings of society. Disap- 
pointingly, Radical Sacrifice does not deliver on this 
ambitious goal. Almost the entirety of Eagleton’s slim vol-
ume reads as a literature review rather than a manifesto 
full of innovative ideas. Despite consistently stunning 
prose, reading Radical Sacrifice often feels like being 
stuck in conversation at a cocktail party with a philoso-
phy major acutely aware of how well-read he is.
The titles of the book’s five chapters promise to address 
hot topics in culture, history, and metaphysics: “Radical 
Sacrifice,” “Tragedy and Crucifixion,” “Martyrdom and 
Mortality,” “Exchange and Excess,” and finally “Kings 
and Beggars.” The eponymous first chapter is the only 
one in which Eagleton’s purported topic is addressed at 
any length; the following chapters, with the exception of 
the final pages of “Kings and Beggars,” cover ideas only 
loosely connected to the idea of sacrifice, and even then 
bringing the themes together requires some real intel-
lectual legwork. Eagleton leaves that work for the reader, 
instead presenting atomized units that discuss, in order, 
the nature of the Crucifixion, death, gift-giving, and the 
scapegoat. (As the reader will notice, the chapter titles 
are sometimes helpful and sometimes misleading.)
Eagleton, who is writing from a Catholic Marxist perspect- 
ive, confidently informs the reader that his book “broods 
on questions not commonly investigated by the political  
left, and certainly not by its postmodern wing. Love, death, 
suffering, sacrifice, evil, martyrdom, forgiveness and so  
on are not exactly modish preoccupations among cultural  
or political theorists today.” To bring these questions into 
postmodern academic discourse is an admirable goal, 
but in attempting to do so, Eagleton ignores those who 
have been working with them outside his own intellectual 
milieu and thus puts forth a shortsighted argument.
EAGLETON BELIEVES THAT SACRIFICE is a crucial model for  
modern politics. He begins with a compelling argument: 
“if sacrifice is a political act, it is not least because it con- 
cerns an accession to power.” He says that “[s]acrifice 
concerns the passage of the lowly, unremarkable thing 
from weakness to power…If sacrifice is often violent, it is 
because the depth of the change it promises cannot be a 
matter of smooth evolution or simple continuity.” This is 
an appealing notion for the religious leftist reader: it is a  
framework for the transformation of the downtrodden into  
the powerful, an alchemic formula that transforms the  
weak into the strong. In a world where religion is deployed  
to prop up unjust and cruel uses of power, to use religious  
discourse to argue for the political—not just spiritual—
power of the weak is innovative. Eagleton’s attempt to do 
so is praiseworthy. In imagining sacrifice as the transfor-
mation of the downtrodden to the powerful, he offers a 
metaphysical grounding for a leftist political project.
But where does this framework of sacrifice come from? 
Eagleton does not provide a satisfying genealogy. Radical 
Sacrifice is a book that quotes frequently and at length. 
Each page is replete with references to philosophy and 
literature; Eagleton cites sources ranging from Hegel to  
Shakespeare. (King Lear is a particular favorite.) Of course, 
the two-and-a-half centuries between Hegel and Shake-
speare are not the only ones available to Eagleton; still, 
one often gets the sense that the quotations in Radical 
Sacrifice are the selections of an erudite man remember-
ing something he already knows rather than the result of 
novel research. Although the text strives, per the intro-
duction, not to “take the dismissive attitude to theology 
generally to be found among left wingers,” one notes the 
absence of any theologian writing after Thomas Aquinas. 
There is great merit in seeking to use sources from one’s 
own area of expertise and intellectual lineage to answer 
new and important questions. However, Eagleton’s seem-
ing ignorance of sources outside of his postmodern 
critical framework leads to an impoverished analysis of 
his subject. There exist libraries upon libraries of liberal 
Christian and non-Christian theology that Eagleton does 
not so much as mention and which could have deeply 
enhanced his argument. His blinders in this area are a 
significant obstacle to both the coherence of his theory 
and its trustworthiness.
EAGLETON’S NOTION OF SACRIFICE depends on Christian  
supersessionist attitudes towards Judaism. Superses- 
sionism is the perspective which, as David Novak defines 
it, “sees Judaism and the Jewish people as that which the  
triumph of Christianity over history has left in the irretriev- 
able past.”* “In speaking of ‘a new covenant,’ He [Jesus]  
has made the first one obsolete,” says Paul in Hebrews 
8:13. God had made a covenant with the Jews, but once 
Jesus came, Christians became true participants in God’s  
covenant, and Jews, who had rejected Jesus as the messiah, 
were no longer deserving of that covenantal relationship.  
Supersessionism, which had been the dominant approach  
to Jews and Judaism within Christianity until modern 
reckonings with anti-Semitism, treats Jesus as the “ful-
fillment” of Jewish Law, bringing the Law to its telos and 
thus ending its claims on the faithful.
The supersessionist attitude towards the Law goes beyond 
rejecting it or treating it as obsolete. Paul says of the Law 
that “[t]he sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the  
law” (1 Corinthians 15:46). The Law he is referring to is what 
was at the time becoming rabbinic law. The stereotype 
that treats this Law as antithetical to love and mercy, and 
therefore the Jews who follow it as cruel and hardhearted, 
has been used to justify anti-Semitism for centuries. The 
prototypical example of this is, of course, Shakespeare’s 
Shylock, the Jewish moneylender, who insists in The 
Merchant of Venice on receiving the pound of flesh he is 
owed despite the human cost.
Among the best-known moments in The Merchant of 
Venice is Portia’s speech about mercy. Dressed as a man 
and pretending to be a lawyer, Portia argues that Shylock 
ought to spare Antonio from giving the pound of flesh 
he has promised as a guarantee for his friend Bassanio, 
Antonio having found himself unable to repay the loan in 
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cash. Shylock has refused Bassanio’s offer of twice the 
money he is owed, insisting instead on the contractual 
pound of flesh. Portia entreats Shylock to be merciful:
It is an attribute to God himself, 
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s 
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, 
Though justice be thy plea, consider this: 
That in the course of justice none of us 
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy, 
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render  
The deeds of mercy. (IV.i.179–197)
Portia contrasts Shylock’s drive for justice, for being given  
what he is owed, with mercy. It is not justice, that strict 
insistence on rule-following, that will bring salvation, she 
contends. It is mercy, which is a defining attribute of God. 
The implication behind these arguments is clear: the Law 
has been superseded not merely because it is outdated, 
but because it is barbarous. This is a paradigm that has 
permeated Western society for centuries, and it is one 
that Eagleton buys wholeheartedly.
IN OUR MODERN, MULTICULTURAL, LIBERAL SOCIETY, it is 
taken for granted that Judaism is one religion among 
many, part of a grand conversation among equally valid 
visions of divine service and meaning. But Eagleton’s 
text demonstrates that this is not yet the case in some 
branches of Christian thought. In explaining how sacri-
fice moved from a physical ritual to the concept he wishes  
to discuss, Eagleton asserts that “it was the exile of the 
Israelites and the destruction of the Temple that forced 
the moral or spiritual aspects of sacrifice to the fore.” It 
is certainly accurate that the destruction of the Temple 
in Jerusalem by Romans in the year 70 CE led to a reli-
gious reckoning, both in emerging Rabbinic Judaism as 
non-sacrificial ritual practice. Eagleton’s statement treats 
Christianity as the inevitable—and only—replacement of 
Temple sacrifice. It is perhaps this troubling assumption 
that leads to the greatest problem in his work: the confla-
tion of sacrifice and martyrdom.
By the end of the first chapter, Eagleton has shifted from 
a discussion of cultic ritual sacrifice and its nature to  
the martyrdom of Jesus. In attempting to reconcile how the 
Biblical prophets can both endorse sacrifice and claim 
that it is inadequate, he concludes that “[t]he oblation that  
counts is the surrender of one’s selfish interests for  
the sake of others,” and then proceeds to assume that “the 
surrender of one’s selfish interests” is identical with  
the surrender of one’s very life.
Without the slightest acknowledgement of a transition 
from one subject to another, Eagleton begins to discuss 
the Crucifixion’s political nature: “[i]t is the tale of a how  
sacrifice as selfless devotion is likely to result in a bloody  
execution at the hands of the state.” Though Eagleton 
devotes an entire chapter to the nature of martyrdom, he 
in no place acknowledges that martyrdom is not a mere 
subcategory of sacrifice. There is a world of difference 
between sacrificing something that belongs to oneself 
and sacrificing one’s very life.
By treating the death of Jesus as the paradigmatic sacri-
fice and the historical culmination of such acts, Eagleton 
not only creates a framework for understanding leftism 
that is dangerous in its political expectations, but also 
actively participates in a history of Christian supersession- 
ism that has done great violence to Jews and that conti- 
nues to ignore the enduring value and relevance of the 
Law to a living group. Eagleton believes that the Law “is 
perverse to the core…Though it is blameless in itself, it 
resembles the kind of grossly inadequate parent who can 
do no more than rub our noses in where we go wrong.” He 
EAGLETON NOT ONLY CREATES A FRAMEWORK 
FOR UNDERSTANDING LEFTISM THAT IS 
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well as in the developing Jesus movement. Both groups 
increasingly prioritized abstract thinking and ideas, in a 
transition from the stark physicality of animal sacrifice. 
However, Eagleton goes on to claim, “acts of love and 
mercy came to assume place of pride over donations  
of corn or the shedding of lambs’ blood. It is the lowly of 
spirit who are great in God’s esteem, not goats or hand-
fuls of grain.”
This analysis of the transition from cultic Temple sacri-
fice to a different form of religious practice is one that 
assumes that the rightful successor to the Jewish Temple 
cult is the Christian religion. It is only in Christianity that 
“acts of love and mercy” have the “place of pride.” Though 
love and mercy are of course important in Judaism, the 
central religious emphasis is the study of legal text and 
adds that “it is a useful device for the moral tenderfoot, 
even if it proves superfluous for those who have spiritu-
ally come of age. The Law is a ladder to be kicked away 
once we have mounted it.”
For Jewish readers who consider themselves bound to 
follow the Law, this is plainly insulting, a dig at a mean-
ingful model of community and service of God, and an 
assertion that Jews have not “spiritually come of age.” But 
as modern Christians—in particular Catholics post-Vatican 
II—work to rectify their long history of anti-Semitism, the 
concept of the Law has been decoupled in Christian 
thought from the idea of the Jewish commitment to it. The 
Law is a “vindictive campaign to bring us to nothing,” says 
Eagleton, not a defining idea for any real people. By ab- 
stracting a concept that is in reality a present and vibrant 
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force in the lives of many Jews, Eagleton articulates what 
would, in a medieval text, read as an attack on Jews.
Eagleton’s reduction of the Law to an abstract, noxious 
force not anchored in any real lives is disturbing, but it 
is consonant with strands of modern Christian discourse 
that deride the Law as merciless without directing that 
criticism at those who observe the Law. More distress-
ing still is his intellectual abstraction from the lives and 
suffering of Jews.
In “Kings and Beggars,” his final chapter, Eagleton devotes 
much ink to a discussion of Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben’s analysis of the Muselmann. The “Muselmänner” 
were those Jews who, forced into concentration camps 
during the Holocaust, had in their starvation and despair 
given up on life. The term originated in the camps them-
selves and has been used by numerous survivors in written 
and oral testimony. The horror of these people’s lives is 
still present in living memory, but Eagleton treats this 
horror as simply an academic curiosity, an example of “a 
kind of living death.” He claims that “this ravaged creature 
is not even tragic, at least in the classical sense of a pro-
tagonist raised by his death to sublime status” and adds 
that “[t]he Muselmann offers men and women an icon of 
their own inhumanity, without a confession of which there 
would be no possibility of redemption.”
The only source Eagleton draws from on the Muselmann 
is Agamben’s book, Remnants of Auschwitz, a philosoph-
ical analysis of survivors’ testimony of the death camp. 
He cites no Jewish scholars and certainly no Jewish sur-
vivors. Real Jews here are as invisible to Eagleton as they 
are in his discussion of the Law. Eagleton treats Jewish 
death as being noteworthy only when it can raise a victim 
to “sublime status.” He ignores a rich literature of Jewish 
post-Holocaust theology to instead instrumentalize the 
suffering and murder of Jews within his Christian philoso- 
phical project. Eagleton’s Muselmann is not a person but  
a “ravaged creature” and an “icon.” Auschwitz is an inter-
esting moment in the history of ideas, not the site of a 
genocide. Jews exist in Eagleton’s thought only as obso-
lete half-siblings or as victims, paradigms of death. This 
is an act of intellectual violence.
EAGLETON’S THEORIZING is built on a disregard for Jews and 
Jewish bodies as well as the assumption that Jews are only 
relevant insofar as they participate in—or, really, represent  
ideas that are important to—his Christian framework. But 
any attempt to create a Christian metaphysics compati-
ble with contemporary leftist ideology must grapple with 
supersessionism. Christianity has historically been the 
source of terrible violence: in the form of missionary work, 
conquest, pogroms, and more. This gory heritage is one 
with intellectual underpinnings, and supersessionism 
is implicated in tremendous Jewish suffering. There are 
theologians doing that work, but Eagleton, with his intel-
lectual blinkers, does not concern himself with them. He 
thus illustrates the potential pitfalls of a leftism based in 
Christian thought.
In the final twenty pages of the book, where he at long last  
makes his argument, Eagleton proposes that the prole-
tariat equals the scapegoat equals Jesus. The scapegoat 
is powerful, he says, because
the more besmirched it becomes, staggering under the  
weight of the transgressions heaped on its head, the 
more admirably selfless it shows itself to be. Its redemp- 
tive power grows as its identification with human sin 
deepens, which is one reason why the sacrificial beast, 
like all sacred things, is both blessed and cursed. The 
scapegoat is an unthinkable animal, at once guilty and 
innocent, blessed and cursed, poison and cure.
Karl Marx, says Eagleton, views the scapegoat as a “revo-
lutionary agent.” Eagleton writes,
Like the sacrificial tribute, it signifies the gain of human- 
ity through the loss of it. Because the poor have less 
of a stake in the status quo than the well-heeled, they 
have less to lose from the impending upheaval which 
Marx calls Communism and Christian Gospel calls the 
Kingdom of God, and are thus more likely to be open 
to its advent. Only by living its wretched condition to 
the full can it hope to annul it, and in doing so abolish 
itself. Seen in this light, revolution is a modern version 
of what the ancient world knew as sacrifice.
This is a politics that cherishes the suffering of the weak 
until the moment it can be made useful. It is the hazard 
of a religion based on the fetishization of the act of ulti-
mate sacrifice. To understand suffering as beautiful, and 
to transfigure or import that idea into a political ideol-
ogy, is to wager victory at the expense of those who are 
suffering. Uplifting the idea of wretchedness will lead to 
wretchedness being preserved. Weakness must never go 
unaddressed in an attempt to create change. An ideology 
that glorifies pain is one that will allow pain to continue. 
Suffering is never beautiful.
EAGLETON’S SUPERSESSIONISM and his advocacy of self- 
sacrifice as the ideal model for modern Marxism are 
not unrelated. Because he views Jesus’s death as the ulti-
mate moment of sacrifice, the purest distillation of the 
idea, he does not consider the possibility of a model in 
which sacrifice can stop short of one’s own life.
Judaism offers another option. In the Ein Yaakov, a collec- 
tion of all of the stories in the Talmud, one finds a dispute 
about which verse is the most important in the Bible. The 
scholar Ben Azzai suggests that it is Genesis 5:1, “this is 
the record of Adam’s line,” the account of Creation. Rabbi 
Akiva offers that it is “love your fellow as yourself.” Shimon 
ben Pazi, by contrast, offers a less intuitive answer in 
Exodus 29:39: “You shall offer the one lamb in the morn-
ing, and you shall offer the other lamb at twilight.” This is 
the commandment to offer the Korban Tamid, the daily 
offering in the Temple, a model of sacrifice in which 
one dedicates all the days of one’s life to a transcendent 
ideal, not through offering one’s life in suffering but by 
committing to daily work. The revolution Eagleton seeks 
will not be found in martyrdom but in achievable sacri-
fices, regularly offered.
Revolution to create a just world does not require death. 
It instead demands a life oriented towards the pursuit 
of a set of ultimate ideals. There is radicalism in regular 
observances—indeed, in Law. To commit oneself daily to 
a set of transcendent precepts, precepts that defy con- 
ventional logic and cut against the less explicit but no less 
present rules of a fundamentally unjust society, is also 
revolutionary. To adhere to Divine Law, the Law of a God 
who, as in Christianity, is hopelessly in love with humanity,  
instead of the fickle and malleable norms of a culture that  
elevates individual success over care for each of God’s  
beloved children, is a means of making this love manifest 
through consistent, small actions.
In his supersessionist bias, Eagleton misses an opportu-
nity to draw from an alternate Biblical picture of a human 
life offered on an altar. If the Binding of Isaac—which 
Eagleton mentions only once, in passing—is a simple pre- 
figuration of the Crucifixion and Resurrection, then it 
does not add to our understanding of sacrifice. But taken 
on its own terms, the Akedah is a vision of martyrdom as 
sacrifice in which it is possible to suffer but not die, to 
sacrifice much of what one has without sacrificing one-
self, to be on the altar but for God to stay the knife. What 
if we had a politics that treated each life not as valuable 
enough to sacrifice, but as too valuable?
David Novak, “Beyond Supersessionism,” First Things,  
March 1998, www.firstthings.com/article/1998/03/005- 
beyond-supersessionism.
*
14
THIS ARTICLE HAS  
BEEN MODIFIED FROM 
A LECTURE AT TRINITY 
COLLEGE DUBLIN,  
NOVEMBER 2017.
GENOCIDE  
AND ETHNIC  
CLEANSING 
IN OUR TIMES: 
FROM THE HOLOCAUST TO  
THE ROHINGYAS
15
motive. But the motive for other genocides may be, 
for instance, territorial conquest, economic gain, or 
religious domination. The intent is what matters: that 
the destruction of the group is consciously desired. 
So, although the Holocaust gave rise to the term 
“genocide,” not all cases of genocide are the same, or 
perhaps as extreme, as the Holocaust.
The term “ethnic cleansing” was used in World War Two 
and then again by Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s. It means 
the forcible expulsion of a community from its home 
region. Ethnic cleansing can be accomplished by com-
mitting genocidal massacres to terrorise survivors and 
make them flee, or it can be achieved without genocide. 
But it too is a crime against international law. In 2002 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (rat-
ified by 119 states) recognized that forced displacement 
and deportation, even in peacetime, constitute crimes 
against humanity when they are “committed as part of  
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population.”
Since the Nazi Holocaust, “extermination” has also been 
a crime against humanity. Extermination is slightly differ- 
ent from genocide. It includes massacres, but also “the  
intentional infliction of conditions of life,” that is “calcu-
lated to bring about the destruction of part of a popula-
tion.” The purpose of these crimes is not relevant to guilt, 
nor do charges of crimes against humanity require proof 
of specific “intent to destroy” a group. And in the case of  
a crime against humanity like extermination, unlike  
genocide, the persecuted group could be a social or a 
political group.
Although many regard genocide as a twentieth-century 
phenomenon, only the term itself and the 1948 criminal-
ization of the act are specific to the twentieth century. 
Similar acts, and similar concepts, have existed for mil- 
lennia. Examples are mentioned in the Bible, and by 
Thucydides. Rome committed genocide against Carthage 
in 146 BC. Crusaders perpetrated genocidal massacres 
against Jews in Europe and against Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine. Mongols committed genocide against several 
thriving cities in the thirteenth century. In the fifteenth, 
Vietnam perpetrated genocide against the neighbouring 
kingdom of Champa. In the sixteenth century Spaniards 
did so in Hispaniola, as did Japanese invading forces  
in Korea.
Though the term “genocide” did not yet exist, the concept  
and the acts did, and other terms served. In 1574 England’s  
Earl of Essex drew up a plan for Ulster, to ensure that “the  
Rebell shalbe utterlie extirped.” O’Neill resistance, Essex  
wrote to London, demanded war “to expulse him, and utter- 
lie to roote him out, or else so to weaken him by takinge 
awaie his dependanntes.” To achieve that, Essex’s troops  
surprised several hundred Clandeboye O’Neills at a  
Christmas feast, and slaughtered them. Essex sent London 
an unconvincing denial: “I never mente to unpeople the 
Cuntrie Clandyboy of their naturall inhabitanntes.” But 
he had.
Soon afterwards in the southern Irish province of Munster, 
an English officer wrote of “pitifull murther, for man, 
woman and child were put to the sworde.” Captain William 
Pelham recorded how in 1580, “We…executed the people 
wherever we found them.” The Earl of Ormond reported 
putting to the sword “about 4000 common people caught 
in cabin and field.” The Irish Annals of the Four Masters 
recorded that “they killed blind and feeble men, women, 
boys and girls, sick persons, idiots and old people”.
Edmund Spenser described how English forces then 
starved Munster by preventing people from farming. “Out 
of every corner of the woods and glynnes they came 
creeping forth upon their hands, for their legges could 
not beare them; they looked like anatomies of death, 
they spake like ghosts crying out of their graves;…that 
in a short space there were none almost left, and a most 
populous and plentifull countrey suddainely left voyde 
of man and beast.” Lord Burghley said that Munster had 
been “dispeopled.”
IN AUGUST 1941, Winston Churchill described Hitler’s 
attack on the Soviet Union: “whole districts are being 
exterminated…Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in 
the Sixteenth Century, there has never been methodical,  
merciless butchery on such a scale…We are in the presence  
of a crime without a name.” News was also leaking out 
about the ongoing Nazi slaughter of nearly six million  
Jews in Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other Nazi- 
occupied territories. In 1943, the Polish Jewish jurist 
Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” for the 
Holocaust of the Jews, the Armenian Genocide in World 
War One, and other cases in global history. In 1945, the 
world said “Never Again.”
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide came into force as an interna-
tional treaty in 1950. It has been signed and ratified by 140 
nations. The Convention defines genocide as acts such 
as “killing members of the group” that are perpetrated 
with the intent to destroy, “in whole or in part,” a “national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Acts of geno-
cide also include “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part.”
Three points are worth making about genocide in inter-
national law:
Political and social groups are not protected by the 
Genocide Convention—only national, ethnic, racial 
and religious groups. Social scientists object to this. 
Judges have to ignore them.
It is not necessary for a perpetrator to intend to 
destroy an entire group. Acts committed with the 
intent to destroy a substantial part of a protected 
group constitute genocide.
The perpetrator’s motive is not mentioned in the 1948 
Convention. The particular motive or purpose of the 
crime is irrelevant in determining guilt. Racial hatred, 
like that of the Nazis for Jews, may be the main 
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As European colonialism expanded across the world and 
settlers took up new lands from indigenous peoples, they 
provoked local resistance, and genocide was sometimes 
the result. Almost the entire continents of North America, 
Australia, and Africa were conquered by American and 
European empires in the nineteenth century alone. Geno-
cides occurred on all three continents.
By 1900, the world had become smaller, the great powers 
greater, and contests for territory closely fought. A new 
phenomenon emerged: genocides perpetrated by dictator- 
ships that had seized control of tottering, shrinking, or 
new empires, aiming to reverse territorial losses or con-
quer new regions from established powers.
The twentieth century offered mass murderers new tech- 
nological, political, or organizational opportunities. Large- 
scale armaments production, telegraph communications, 
widespread civilian enlistment into military organizations,  
and rapid mass transportation by land and sea all facil-
itated projects as ambitious and extensive as genocide. 
The advent of “total war” and totalitarianism now offered 
prospective genocidists not only cover and ideological 
rationales for their crimes but unprecedented efficiency.
Greater population pressure on the land also increased 
the numbers of potential victims. The estimated world-
wide population, which doubled to nearly 1 billion from 
1500 to 1800, almost doubled again in the nineteenth 
century, to around 1.75 billion people by 1910. Land 
became scarcer, and human resources in less demand. 
For expansionist regimes, mass killing now presented 
potentially greater benefits with less risk of labor short-
ages. For new twentieth-century totalitarian party-states 
propounding race or class ideologies, entire groups of 
people became inimical or expendable. While the Nazis 
pursued their racial victims and territorial conquests, 
the Communist giants, Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China, 
pursued mass killing of domestic political enemies and 
social “classes.”
During the Cold War that followed the Nazis’ defeat, polit-
ical massacres and genocides occurred on both sides. In 
1965–66, the U.S.-backed Indonesian army supervised the 
murder of half a million or more communists and alleged 
communists, and then went on a decade later to invade 
East Timor and kill another hundred thousand people in 
what a UN-sponsored Truth Commission called “extermi-
nation as a crime against humanity.” In 1971 the Pakistani 
military conducted a genocide in Bangladesh, and in 1975 
Pol Pot’s Cambodian Communist Party took power and 
subjected Cambodia to a genocide that ended 1.7 million 
lives in four years. The Guatemalan military regime com-
mitted genocide against ethnic Mayan Indians in 1981–83.
Throughout this Cold War period, the 1948 Genocide 
Convention was never enforced. The United States did not  
even ratify the Convention until 1988.
The end of the Cold War saw no reduction in the occur-
rence of genocides, but it finally ushered in the first 
enforcement of the Genocide Convention. War crimes 
committed in Bosnia provoked the UN Security Council 
to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to try perpetrators like Ratko Mladic. 
Then the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the country’s Tutsi 
minority, in three months the fastest episode of mass 
killing since the Holocaust, obliged the UN to set up ano-
ther tribunal for Rwanda. In 1998, the former mayor of 
Kigali became the first person to be convicted of genocide 
in an international court, fifty years after the Genocide 
Convention came into being.
As the court found in convicting Mladic last year, the 
massacre of Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica in 1995  
fit the international legal definition of genocide. To “totally  
destroy North Korea,” a country of 25 million people, as 
Donald Trump threatened to do in 2017, would also be to 
commit genocide. The same applies to the threats of Kim 
Jong-un’s North Korean regime, which asserted: “The four 
islands of the [Japanese] archipelago should be sunken 
into the sea by the nuclear bomb,” adding that “Japan is 
no longer needed to exist near us.” And, the statement 
went on, “Let’s reduce the U.S. mainland into ashes and  
darkness.” North Korea and the United States are both 
signatories to the Genocide Convention. In Trump’s case  
it was unprecedented for a leader of a state that has 
signed it to mount a U.N. platform, as he did in the General 
Assembly last year, and flout this core component of 
international criminal law. The UN Security Council,  
of which the United States is a member, is charged with 
implementing the Convention, and Trump’s threats of geno- 
cide, even if not carried out, only weakened its mandate.
In 2017 the fate of the Rohingyas in Burma, or Myanmar, 
became the most pressing current case of ethnic cleans-
ing. In September, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights called their mistreatment a “textbook example” of 
ethnic cleansing. UN Secretary-General António Guterres 
added: “When one third of the Rohingya population had 
to flee the country, can you find a better word to describe 
it?” By the end of 2017, about 700,000 Rohingyas had fled 
into Bangladesh.
A Muslim minority of approximately 1.4 million in a largely  
Buddhist country, Rohingyas have lived in the Arakan 
region of what is now Burma since the 15th century or ear- 
lier. In 1799, the British scholar Francis Buchanan wrote 
of the Rohingya people as “long settled in Arakan.” He 
mentioned “three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire, 
but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu 
nation.” One was “that spoken by the Mohammedans, 
who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves 
Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.”¹
When British colonial rule ended in 1948, the Rohingyas 
became citizens of a democratic, independent Union of  
Burma. But the Burmese army seized power there in 1962, 
and deprived Rohingyas of their citizenship in 1982. Mean- 
while military abuses and pressure on them only increased.
In 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingyas fled into Bangladesh 
from their homes in Burma’s Rakhine (Arakan) State. From 
late 1991 to mid-1992, another 250,000 Rohingya refugees  
crossed the border. Burmese military personnel had 
reportedly warned two women who arrived in Bangladesh 
in January 1994 that they should leave the country. “Why 
are you staying here?,” they asked one of the women, 
who was “specifically told by the military that she would 
be beaten by the military personnel.”²
The oppression continued, provoking resistance, and esca- 
lated into the current crisis after the 2015 elections brought 
into government the longtime political prisoner Aung San  
Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD). On 
October 9, 2016, “Rohingya men and boys armed mostly 
with sticks and knives attacked three police outposts, 
reportedly killing nine police.” In a massive overreaction, 
the Myanmar Army led attacks “on Rohingya civilians in 
approximately 40 villages in Maungdaw Township, dis-
placing more than 94,000 civilians.”³
On August 25, 2017, a small Rohingya insurgent group, the 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked military 
posts. The army, now alleging that the insurgents were 
affiliated with the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), escalated  
its attacks on Rohingyas as a group. Commentator John 
Pennington noted that ARSA’s predecessor organization, 
The Faith Movement, “was launched in 2012 by exiled 
Rohingyas in Saudi Arabia,” but that “there is no evidence 
suggesting ARSA and ISIS have joined forces.”⁴
In December 2017, the head of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, took the matter to 
another level when he said that “that Myanmar’s secu-
rity forces may be guilty of committing genocide.” On 
February 1, 2018, the Associated Press published detailed 
evidence of five mass graves of Rohingya victims of “sys-
tematic slaughter.”⁵
The U.N. special envoy on human rights in Myanmar, 
Yanghee Lee, concurred that the Myanmar army’s vio-
lence against Rohingya Muslims bears “the hallmarks of 
a genocide.” Lee told reporters that she couldn’t make 
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a definitive declaration about genocide until a credible 
international tribunal or court had weighed the evidence, 
but “we are seeing signs and it is building up to that.” She 
described her recent visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh 
and other areas in the region to discuss the Rohingya 
crisis. The government of Myanmar refused her entrance 
to the country.
Yanghee Lee added that “we’ve called for a fact finding 
mission…and access for international media” to the areas  
in northern Rakhine state where the Rohingya live. Lee 
said that Myanmar’s actions were “amounting to crimes 
against humanity.” “These are part of the hallmarks of a 
genocide,” she said. “I think Myanmar needs to get rid of 
this baggage of ‘did you or did you not,’ and if proven that 
they did, then there has to be responsibility and account-
ability. No stones must be left unturned because the 
people, the victims, the families of the victims definitely 
deserve an answer,” she went on.⁶
Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, head of the UN Human Rights 
Council, reiterated this accusation more strongly on 
March 7, when he warned that the brutal treatment of 
Rohingya Muslims by the government of Myanmar since 
August 2017 may be classified as “acts of genocide.”⁷ He 
told the Human Rights Council of the bulldozing of mass 
graves in what he considers a “deliberate attempt by the 
authorities to destroy evidence of potential international 
crimes, including possible crimes against humanity.”
After decades of military violence against them, and the 
NLD’s silent neglect, it is perhaps predictable that ISIS 
might find some sympathizers among the hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya refugees. Targeting all Rohingya, 
however, is ethnic cleansing or genocide, an interna-
tional crime. China aids the Burmese regime and shields 
it from UN Security Council action, while the Burmese 
military, backed by Aung San Suu Kyi, has continued to 
block a UN inquiry commission.⁸
In the absence of an official UN commission, over a 21- 
month period the non-government organization Fortify 
Rights gathered testimony from 254 survivors, officials 
and aid workers. On July 19, 2018, it released a 162-
page report entitled “They Gave Them Long Swords”: 
Preparations for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 
Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar. 
This report documented “eight crimes against human-
ity—murder, extermination, rape, deportation or forcible 
transfer, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, 
and persecution—as well as three acts of genocide com-
mitted with a special intent to destroy the Rohingya in 
whole or in part.”⁹
Importantly, the report also documented the preparations, 
which began after the attacks of October 2016, for these 
crimes. According to Fortify Rights, from that date “the 
Myanmar military and civilian authorities: 1) “disarmed” 
Rohingya civilians, systematically collecting sharp or blunt  
objects from Rohingya civilian homes; 2) systematically 
tore down fencing and other structures around Rohingya 
homes, providing the military with a greater line-of-sight 
on civilians; 3) trained and armed local non-Rohingya 
citizens in northern Rakhine State; 4) deprived Rohingya 
civilians of food and other aid, systematically weakening 
them physically; 5) built up state security forces in north-
ern Rakhine State to unnecessary levels;” and imposed 
discriminatory curfews against Rohingya civilians.¹⁰
The 2017 crimes against humanity and genocide were 
perpetrated by at least 27 army combat battalions com-
posed of 11,000 troops and 900 members of three police 
combat battalions.¹¹
Fortify Rights also reported that in both 2016 and 2017, “a 
large number of soldiers acting under military control” 
committed crimes in northern Rakhine State without inter- 
ruption over many months, “in a similar fashion through-
out multiple locations.” In some cases, “Myanmar Army 
commanders were physically present while assemblages 
of soldiers raped and gang-raped women and girls, fatally 
shot and cut the throats of men, women, and children, 
and burned people to death, including infant children. Eye- 
witness testimony shows that in multiple locations and 
on similar timelines, Myanmar Army soldiers massacred 
large numbers of civilians and discarded their bodies 
in mass graves or burned piles of bodies, all in the pres-
ence of large numbers of soldiers. The fact that different 
bands of soldiers performed these same actions repeat-
edly and across disparate locations further suggests know- 
ledge by commanders of the crimes.”¹²
The genocidal persecution of the Rohingyas and the pur- 
ported appearance of ISIS in Burma are symptoms of the  
challenges the international community faces. The 2003 
US/UK invasion of Iraq, based on the false premise of 
Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and con- 
ducted without UN support, spawned an international 
insurgency that transformed into ISIS. It seized territory 
in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It conducted genocide against 
Yazidis in Iraq, ethnic cleansing against Shia Muslims and 
Arab Christians, and war crimes against Kurdish, Iraqi 
and Syrian forces. Now losing ground in the Middle East, 
ISIS is active in Southeast Asia. Its fearful reputation, 
and the apparently false report of its activity in Myanmar 
have only fuelled the violent Islamophobia of the Burmese 
military and Rakhine Buddhist activists, and sparked off 
the region’s worst episode of ethnic cleansing and quite 
possibly genocide since Pol Pot’s genocide of ethnic 
Vietnamese and Cham Muslims in the late 1970s.
While the Myanmar military was carrying out criminal 
acts against the Rohingya people in 2017, Donald Trump 
was threatening to “totally destroy” North Korea, and 
China blocked any UN investigation into the plight of the 
Rohingyas. The great powers must reform their reckless 
rhetoric and dangerous policies, and set to work to tackle 
this continuing international tragedy. The United States 
and China should cooperate with the UN to end genocide.
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A POEM
AT  
OXENHOLME 
RAILWAY 
STATION
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The train, the hour—late, late late.
Sipping warm lemonade from a glass bottle,
I stare at the men who have been drinking since ten this morning.
An old tradition, they say: this stumbling along the yellow stripes
of the platform, this laughter at the mention of green fairies  
near the lakes,
spots of strange color. I must turn away.
Earlier, I was busy
dropping gingerbread crumbs on William
and Dorothy’s graves, fumbling
for an umbrella in the light rain. In Keswick
artists had set up shop at a little church
that smelled of strong perfume. “Poetry,”
one was called. I dabbed a little on my wrists. The scent
comes home on my jacket sleeves.
It was hard to resist collecting the portraits
of sheep, posed like a close family, in lovely Ambleside,
and at a leather and fur store I ran my fingers
through coarse Herdwick wool.
In Grasmere I bought a postcard for fifty pence in loose change
and told myself I was doing it right. It was also right
to tour Dove Cottage at half past two, before the rain got too bad,
but it might have been more right to go at three
when the bird in his cuckoo clock came out. Wordsworth,
the guide announced, loved that clock. Loves? He
is the Lake District’s great son, still. They are rather proud,
the three drunk men. One of them borrows
my multicolored pen to write his email on an old football ticket.
The scrawled letters run together on the damp paper.
His friend lights a cigarette in the grey drizzle. The train pulls  
into the station.
I am a face in the window with eyes fixed north.
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the American Plan included John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who 
funded the Plan at the federal level; Eliot Ness, who ran 
the federal agency that oversaw the American Plan during  
WWII; Earl Warren, as state attorney general and then 
governor of California. Eleanor Roosevelt was complicit.  
Her husband Franklin was complicit. Dwight D. Eisenhower 
was a big fan. Fiorello La Guardia was a big fan. People in 
every level of government and every branch of govern-
ment were complicit, if not active fans. There were very 
few voices of dissent within the government and very few 
voices of dissent without the government—with the excep- 
tion of a handful of committed activists, reformers, and 
journalists, and the incarcerated women themselves.
B: DID THE AVERAGE AMERICAN KNOW ABOUT THE PLAN?
S: That’s a complicated question. Sexually transmitted 
infections were incredibly stigmatized in the early- to 
mid-twentieth century. The surgeon general himself was  
not allowed to say the word syphilis on the radio in 1934. 
It was hard to write about in the newspaper. People did, 
they just did so with euphemism. Most people were aware  
what was going on. There are a lot of records of govern-
ment agents writing to each other about what people on 
the street were talking about. Certainly, the women who 
were behind bars had their free speech curtailed. But 
this was something that was, at the time, widely known.
B: THE TRIALS OF NINA MCCALL IS FILLED WITH THE MANY 
WAYS WOMEN FOUGHT BACK AGAINST THE AMERICAN PLAN. 
WHO WERE THESE WOMEN, AND WHAT DID THEIR RESISTANCE  
LOOK LIKE?
S: As a rule, they were lower-income, they were dispropor- 
tionately women of color, and they were women who were  
perceived by men and women in power as sexually promis- 
cuous. But at the time that could mean so many things. 
It could be a woman out on a date with a man, a woman 
seen walking alone, a woman sitting in a restaurant alone,  
a woman drinking alcohol. All of those women were  
suspicious enough to get detained, forcibly examined for 
an STI and, if she tested positive, incarcerated without 
due process.
The prostitutes themselves began conducting a series 
of highly rigorous studies to document that they were 
not, in fact, common vectors of infection. The reason for 
that is pretty simple: the rate of female-to-male vaginal 
transmission is very low. And they conducted a number 
of studies to prove that. These studies were published 
in The Lancet, in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association. Women from [the rights organization Call 
Off Your Old Tired Ethics] COYOTE and other organiza-
tions testified before state legislatures in order to push 
back against proposals that they be mass-tested or quar-
antined. That has largely been forgotten.
What’s also largely been forgotten is the role in this of 
Robert Redfield, President Trump’s Director of the Center 
for Disease Control. In 1984, Robert Redfield, who was 
a physician at Walter Reed Naval Hospital, released a 
study that he had done on some 41 soldiers. He found that  
a large number of soldiers infected with HIV had been 
infected by female prostitutes. A number of people at the 
time pointed out that this was probably inaccurate, because 
the studies relied on men reporting this themselves. And 
of course these men were not going to report that they 
had been injecting drugs or sleeping with other men. But 
this study was widely publicized and it launched calls 
across the nation for the quarantining of prostitutes. 
Robert Redfield later oversaw the mass testing of mili-
tary recruits, which led anyone trying to get into the  
military who tested positive to be barred from the military. 
Those already in the military were isolated in treatment 
wards that some called leper colonies. It led at least one 
soldier to try and kill himself.
For the American Plan’s entire existence, from the 1910s 
up through the sixties and seventies, women fought back 
vigorously. It’s impossible to say with any exactness, but 
hundreds if not thousands of women escaped from their 
detention facilities. Hundreds if not thousands of women 
Between World War I and 1980, tens of thousands of 
American women were arrested without due process and 
quarantined on the suspicion that they were prostitutes, 
sexually promiscuous, or carried a sexually transmitted 
infection. The program to incarcerate suspicious women, 
which had support in every state and at every level of the 
federal government, was known as the “American Plan.” It 
is the subject of Scott W. Stern’s recent book, The Trials 
Of Nina McCall (Beacon Press, 2018). Stern, who is in his 
second year at Yale Law School, began researching the 
American Plan as an undergraduate at Yale College. He 
spoke with BRINK about the American Plan and the ways 
its victims resisted persecution. Below is an edited and 
condensed transcript of the interview.
BRINK: WHAT WAS THE AMERICAN PLAN?
STERN: The American Plan was the system under which 
U.S. government officials locked up tens, probably hun-
dreds of thousands of women without due process in 
what were essentially concentration camps. They did this 
because they suspected the women had sexually trans-
mitted infections, syphilis or gonorrhea, or because  
they suspected the women were prostitutes, or they sim-
ply suspected that the women were promiscuous. This 
started in World War I, and it was justified as protecting  
the national security by protecting soldiers from wayward  
women who were going to infect them with STIs. But it 
wasn’t entirely justified by that because the Plan contin-
ued for decades after WWI. It continued through WWII 
into the fifties, and in some places into the sixties and 
seventies. All of the laws that enabled the American Plan 
remain on the books to this day.
B: WHO IN GOVERNMENT KNEW ABOUT THIS? HOW FAR UP 
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DID THE AMERICAN PLAN GO?
S: Everyone knew, from the president of the United States  
on down. This was in large part funded at the federal level  
by Woodrow Wilson, in a sense personally. He dispersed 
money from what was basically a WWI-era presidential 
slush fund in order to construct federally funded deten-
tion facilities for women. People who played a role in 
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rioted, physically fought back against their captors. A 
huge number of their detention facilities caught fire and  
a number of fires, we know, were set by the female inmates 
themselves. There are records of women holding hunger 
strikes. There are records of women speaking out in the 
press. I found the record of a woman who leapt from a 
moving train rather than go to one of these detention faci- 
lities. I found the record of a woman jumping out of a 
window to her death rather than remain in a detention 
facility. Women resisted in so many ways.
Another common method of resistance involved suing 
the government. This at a time when it was very difficult 
for stigmatized women to get access to counsel and then 
to have their case heard in court. Still, a lot of women 
sued the government, and we know this because of the 
number of cases that reached appellate courts. We also 
know that the government tried very hard to suppress 
these lawsuits. Federal agents put a ton of pressure on 
the American Bar Association to in turn put pressure  
on its lawyers not to represent these women. And, in some 
cases, the ABA did that. Federal agents also put pressure 
on judges not to go easy on these women. Nonetheless, 
women continued to sue and in a couple cases won. Still, 
the laws themselves were never overturned.
B: HOW DID THE AMERICAN PLAN END?
S: The American Plan operated on a local level for most  
of its history. Every state and hundreds of cities across 
the country passed laws enabling local officials to detain,  
examine, and incarcerate women. The Plan ended in 
various places in different times. In some places we can 
pinpoint an exact moment when it ended. In other places 
it just faded out. This happened in the fifties, in the six- 
ties, and in the seventies. In San Francisco, into the 
mid-1970s officials continued to detain and hold women 
without due process for 72 hours and examine them for 
STIs. They had been ordered to stop doing this in the late 
forties, but officials just didn’t comply. The Plan really 
ended in San Francisco because of the rise of the Sex 
Workers’ Rights Movement. There was an organization 
called Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics, COYOTE, which 
was founded by a remarkable woman named Margo St. 
James, who is still alive, that advocated for the decrimi- 
nalization of sex work and prostitution. It advocated for 
their voice in medicine and in the political process, and 
it was largely motivated in the early days by the lingering 
remnants of the American Plan. COYOTE launched pro-
tests, did their own investigations, and eventually they 
partnered with the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] 
to sue Alameda County and they won. In one jurisdic-
tion, the judge said that if they wanted to enforce these 
American Plan laws, they’d have to enforce them equally 
against men and women, and so of course male officials 
stopped enforcing it. This betrayed the fundamental sex-
ism of the program.
B: WHAT HAPPENED IN THE 1980S WITH HIV/AIDS VIS-À-VIS 
THE AMERICAN PLAN?
S: It’s important to remember that all of the American Plan  
laws remain on the books in some form to this day. In the 
early eighties, when the epidemic broke out, there were 
surprisingly few calls for quarantine. That was because 
people thought AIDS was something only a couple popu-
lations could get—gay men, Haitians, IV drug users, and 
hemophiliacs, the so-called Four-H’s. But a couple explo-
sive media incidents happened in 1984 and 1985—includ-
ing the death of Rock Hudson, and the widely publicized 
arrest of a sex worker in New Haven, Connecticut—that 
led the general population to believe that they too were at  
risk, that straight people too might get this. That launched  
in mid-1985 a state of incredibly punitive attempts to 
police those with AIDS or those suspected of having AIDS,  
especially prostitutes and sex workers. And officials 
repeatedly said, “we have these laws on the books from 
the American Plan, maybe we should use them again.” 
And so you saw dozens of states across the country con- 
sider quarantining people on a large scale. Polls suggested 
that huge numbers of Americans supported that. Many 
states specifically added AIDS to the list of conditions 
that could be quarantined. And there were a handful of 
cases of quarantine across the country, mostly of sex wor- 
kers. Thankfully, it was not put in place on any broad scale— 
in part because of the activism of sex workers and peo-
ple with AIDS themselves, who launched protests and did 
their own studies and who in very real ways fought back.
B: THE OFFICIALS IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN CITED CONCERNS 
OVER PUBLIC HEALTH. HOW CREDIBLE DO YOU THINK THOSE 
CLAIMS WERE?
S: For much of the twentieth century—before the advent 
of sulfa drugs and penicillin—STIs did run rampant. Huge 
percentages of people had syphilis or gonorrhea. They 
were difficult to treat and they were unpleasant. There 
is reason to believe that syphilis and gonorrhea were 
among the largest causes of disability that the American 
army suffered during WWI and around that time.
That said, this program made no sense at all from a public  
health standpoint. For one, if you’re going to quarantine 
people to prevent a transmissible infection, it doesn’t 
make sense to quarantine just half the public—that is, 
women but no men. There were a couple men incarcerated 
under the plan, but very few. It’s not a sensible approach 
to public health. Rather, it’s a means of controlling women. 
Second, the ostensible reason they were incarcerating 
women was to treat them for STIs. But they did not have 
effective treatments back then. The most common treat-
ment at the time was an injection of mercury. Another 
common treatment was an injection of arsenic-based 
drugs. These things did very little to cure you of your infec- 
tion. They did, however, hurt tremendously, and caused 
all kinds of terrible, painful side effects. And, if continued 
long enough, they could kill you.
It’s also important to remember that the diagnostic mech- 
anisms for syphilis and gonorrhea were very flawed at 
the time. There’s reason to believe that the Wasserman 
examination, which was the most common blood test for 
syphilis at the time, could have a false positive rate up 
to 25 percent. The test for gonorrhea involved the visual 
inspection of microscopic slides, which was notoriously 
unreliable. So again, from a public health standpoint, this  
just doesn’t make sense.
B: BUT DID PEOPLE THINK THAT AT THE TIME? AS YOU CITE, 
THERE WERE MANY STUDIES SHOWING, WE NOW KNOW 
ERRONEOUSLY, THAT 90 PERCENT OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED 
INFECTIONS WERE TRANSMITTED BY PROSTITUTES.
S: Those studies were based on flawed science, and there  
are a number of scholars who have demonstrated that. 
People were not aware generally that the diagnostic tech-
niques were really pretty unreliable. That was not widely 
known. The limitations on the medical treatment were 
fairly well known. And it’s important not to look back at 
historical actors like physicians and think, “Boy, people 
used to be so stupid.” That’s not a sensible approach  
to the history of medicine; it’s not a sensible approach to 
history. But people were generally aware that there were 
extreme limitations to what they could accomplish with 
these medical treatments. And there are instances in 
which you see people talk about or write about the incar-
ceration of women as a form of punishment and not as a 
form of treatment.
There’s an example of a health agent in California saying 
to a lawyer, “If I wanted, I could go arrest your wife.” It 
was clearly used as a tool of power. It was fundamentally 
about controlling women, about controlling infection.
B: IF IT’S UNPRODUCTIVE TO SAY HISTORICAL ACTORS WERE 
STUPID, IS IT PRODUCTIVE THEN TO SAY THAT THEY WERE 
MISOGYNISTIC, RACIST, CLASSIST?
S: I think the answer is yes. But I think it’s important not 
to see them as uniquely or distinctly misogynistic, or  
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racist, or classist. Because that risks celebrating who we 
are right now. In my opinion, our society remains funda- 
mentally sexist and racist and classist. It’s important to 
honestly assess people in the past, even people who we 
lionize, like Earl Warren or Eleanor Roosevelt, because 
it’s important to see these continuities, see how the car-
ceral regime that began in the early twentieth century 
has effects to this day, and the philosophy that it cemented 
about women persists to this day. We still disproportion- 
ately police women who sell sex and arrest the men who  
purchase that sex at a much, much lower rate. We still 
disproportionately detain women of color for these crimes. 
And very importantly, the physical facilities that housed 
women under the American Plan in many cases exist to 
this day. There are continuities here we should remember.
B: WHAT ABOUT ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, SOMEONE WIDELY 
REGARDED AS A CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS? SHE’S NOT 
PORTRAYED FLATTERINGLY IN YOUR BOOK. WHAT ARE WE TO 
DO WITH SOMEONE LIKE HER?
S: We should treat Eleanor Roosevelt as someone of her  
time, and at her time an elite woman like herself would’ve  
had very negative impressions of sexually promiscuous 
women, of sexually liberated women. At the same time, 
though, Eleanor Roosevelt was a person with agency. She 
certainly had the ability to make her own choices and 
in this case made profoundly wrong choices. She raised 
money for an organization that was integral to the incar-
ceration of thousands of women. She was at meetings at 
which federal agents talked about locking up thousands of 
women, and she did not object. She was totally aware of 
the American Plan and did not speak out, while she was 
speaking out about a number of other social ills, a num-
ber of other bigoted programs. So while we should not treat 
her as some sort of uniquely evil figure, and we should 
remember all the good that she did, we should also see her 
as having done some less than good things, and see her as 
fundamentally a product of her time and place and class, 
which is to say a somewhat close-minded person.
B: YOU WRITE THAT THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PLAN HAS 
NOT JUST BEEN FORGOTTEN BUT ACTIVELY BURIED. HOW?
S: First, there’s the intentional suppression of the free 
speech of these women. There are a number of cases in 
which they were denied access to counsel. Most facilities 
that incarcerated these women refused to allow visitors 
so they couldn’t tell people what was happening. Their 
mail was read, and so they couldn’t write what was truly 
happening when they were inside these facilities. In all 
those ways, their stories were buried.
Probably more importantly, elite men and women played 
a role in the maintenance of a culture that so stigma-
tized incarceration, sexually transmitted infections, and 
sexual promiscuity that women simply weren’t able to 
talk about this. It was too stigmatized. They wouldn’t be 
able to get jobs if they talked about this. They certainly 
wouldn’t be able to find partners if they talked about this. 
And newspapers simply wouldn’t print these words in a 
lot of cases. In all these ways, their stories have not just 
been forgotten but intentionally obscured.
B: YOU DON’T BUY THAT THESE LOCAL ENFORCERS WERE 
SIMPLY DOING THEIR JOB AS ORDERED FROM ON HIGH,  
THAT THEY WERE FOOT SOLDIERS IN A WAR THAT WASN’T 
THEIR MAKING.
S: No, I don’t, because this literally wasn’t coming from 
on high. It may have started as a top-down program 
during World War I but officials continued to enforce this 
from the twenties through the sixites. And they could 
have stopped it at any time. But they didn’t, because they 
didn’t see anything wrong with this. In fact, officials male 
and female believed they were helping these women. 
They knew what they were doing, they made choices, 
they had agency, of course we should view them as prod-
ucts of their time but it’s also important to view them 
as people with the ability to choose. And they chose to 
lock thousands of women up in what some women called 
concentration camps.
B: HOW DO YOU UNCOVER THIS STORY AND NOT EMERGE 
DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC?
S: You do become incredibly pessimistic, and there’s no 
escaping that. How would you feel if your sister, or your 
mother, or your girlfriend were walking down the street 
and were detained, examined in the most personal way 
imaginable, and then locked away without a trial, for 
months, to be pumped full of poison and then released 
and told that she was less-than? How would you feel? It’s 
profoundly unfair, and I think everyone can grasp that.
We’ve been taught so many mythologized and sanitized 
versions of history that it’s depressing, I think, to read 
what actually happened. What uplifts me at the end of the  
day is the resistance from the women who were incarcer-
ated. The fact that people fought back against great odds 
and in some cases won, and even when they lost contin-
ued to fight back, and that people fight back to this day—
that’s what gets me out of bed in the morning.
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political economy—and the political language—that it  
can shelter?
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s new book on an old problem of  
representation, As If: Idealization and Ideals, could easily 
have shared a title with the works of Greenspan and 
Houellebecq. Instead, he wisely steers clear of well-trodden 
metaphors, even as he embraces and illuminates their  
underlying logic. Appiah is concerned with the ubiquity 
of “idealization”—proceeding “as if” what we know to be 
strictly false were true—in diverse academic disciplines 
and realms of human activity. “We need many pictures of 
the world to do anything—to do science, to do ethics, to 
do politics,” he said in a recent interview. These pictures 
are always “going to be imperfect…it’s only useful if it 
leaves stuff out.”⁴
Appiah lifts his definition of idealization from the vocab-
ulary of the philosophy of science, and his framework 
roughly from the work of Hans Vaihinger, a little-known 
Kant scholar who published The Philosophy of ‘As If’ in 
1911. Appiah’s argument, at first glance, appears to be 
less about substance (it does not aim “to announce any 
startling discoveries”) than about relevance: the book 
offers itself as an amicable, erudite, and at times hurried 
180-page advertisement for the concept of idealization as 
a vital topic of research beyond its narrow origins. We  
make simplifying assumptions in scientific models or poli- 
tical philosophy, Appiah explains, even though we know 
that gases are not colliding point masses, people are not 
in full compliance with norms of justice, and nation-
states are not fully independent Westphalian sovereigns. 
We describe rational agents in economics, even though 
we know that real people are not optimal profit-maxi-
mizers with perfectly rational expectations. We respond 
emotionally to theater, even though we know that no one 
really dies. And, Appiah argues, we ascribe identities 
of race or sexual orientation to ourselves and to others, 
even though we hold that these categories are fictional.
Regardless of their content, idealizations may be justi-
fied—and necessary—on the pragmatic grounds that they 
are “useful for managing the world, including, sometimes, 
ourselves.” We need idealized models in so many fields 
not because they are true (they aren’t), but because they 
make the world intelligible to us, and equip us with the 
cognitive resources to act upon it, where a true represen- 
tation would be impossible for us or unsuited to our pur- 
poses. Appiah reminds the reader again and again that  
the question that defines and justifies an idealization is:  
“For what purposes is the assumption useful?” Idealizations 
are the tools and preconditions of human agency.
AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION, economic idealizations have 
increasingly become subject to public scrutiny. From 
populist and leftist discourse to behavioral economics 
and crisis memoirs like Greenspan’s The Map and the 
Territory, critiques of rational choice theory as ideal—or 
as plain falsehood—have been in vogue. While its first 
and third chapters mostly summarize and reframe exist-
ing scholarship, As If presents its most original contri-
butions in the second chapter: an extended, partially 
vindicating treatment of the probability theory behind 
rational choice, a beloved subject of Appiah’s for over 
thirty years.
Subjective preference and probability provide the scaf- 
folding for modern economics. In order to model a utility- 
maximizing agent’s free choice under uncertainty, an 
economist must be able to calculate and compare her 
expected utility of each option. That is, we need to be 
able to quantify both the desirability of the possible out-
comes of each option to the agent, and the likelihood of 
each possible outcome, as assessed by the agent.
Engaging closely with Frank Ramsey’s early twentieth cen- 
tury formalization of rational choice theory, Appiah con-
vincingly argues that all attempts to render subjective 
probability and preference calculable rest on idealiza-
tion: clearly, actual agents are not capable of these instan- 
OF ALL OF LEWIS CARROLL’S FANTASTICAL WORLDS, one of  
the most enduring and impossible is a simple map. In res- 
ponse to a Victorian traveler’s explanation that the largest  
useful scale of a map is about six inches to the mile, one 
of his characters exclaims: “Only six inches! We very soon  
got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a hundred yards  
to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We 
actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a 
mile to the mile!” Yet the map remains folded in disuse, 
as farmers objected that the map would block the sun-
light: “So we now use the country itself, as its own map, 
and I assure you it does nearly as well.”¹
The gap Carroll charted between map and territory—be- 
tween representation and reality—has since become wide 
enough to fit a host of enemy ideologies from diverse and 
far-flung disciplines. The tattered remains of Carroll’s 
one-to-one scale map litter the once-conquered desert, 
a disused fantasy of empire in Borges’ “On Exactitude in 
Science”; in Baudrillard’s critique of US imperialism, it 
is instead the territory “whose shreds are slowly rotting 
across the map.”² In the past seven years, Alan Greenspan, 
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Michel 
Houellebecq, author of Submission, published books with 
the same title: The Map and the Territory.
Carroll’s articulation of the problem of representation—
the impossibility and uselessness of a perfect represen-
tation, the necessity of an imperfect and thus strictly 
false map—has had a long afterlife. The image of the map 
and the territory occurs so pervasively, in such a wide 
variety of contexts, that it can fade into the problem it 
seeks to represent, appearing to have no content of its 
own. But how is it that the fable of the one-to-one map 
has proven so remarkably elastic, accommodating both 
critics of imperialism and mourners of empire, free mar-
ket deregulators and post-Keynesian Marxists,³ abstruse 
postmodernists and hard-nosed economists? Why is it  
that the map and the territory is how we pose the question  
of representation, and what constraints does Carroll’s 
formula place on its answers? What are the limits of the 
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taneous, perfect logical calculations. In order to determine 
how the “content” of our beliefs—our actual preferences 
and probabilities—affects our actions, we must idealize 
away our actual cognitive capacities and constraints. But 
a single rational agent could never come to hold all of our 
inconsistent preferences and probabilities in the first 
place, so we must have some way of reconciling a necess- 
ary multiplicity of idealizations into the action of a single 
agent. In order to understand actual agents, we need a 
second step that, idealizing away from content, explains 
how the form of our beliefs—our deviations from “logical 
omniscience”—affects our actions.
Two successive theories, Appiah argues, are necessary to 
understand agency: one conditional upon the assumption 
that agents perfectly adhere to certain norms, and then 
one conditional upon the assumption that agents do not. 
But, Appiah implies, dual theories of normativity and error  
characterize more than just the market:
What we see here is the intimate connection between 
the description of a person or community as recognizing  
certain norms—a description that might be offered from 
the perspective of an outsider—and the understanding 
of those norms from the perspective of the member of 
the community from the point of view of the insider… 
To see this is to see that an agent is not simply a thing 
that conforms, more or less inadequately, to the con-
straints of rationality that decision theory represents, 
but also a person who recognizes, however imperfectly, 
those constraints as rationally binding.
It is not a coincidence that so many of the idealizations 
that populate As If “characterize the norms, conformity 
to which constitutes someone, for our community, as what  
we call ‘an agent’”: intentional minds, economic actors, 
sovereign nation-states, racialized and sexual persons. 
Idealizations are the cognitive prerequisites for our indi-
vidual action on the world, but they also bear our commu-
nal definitions of who counts as an agent.
But, Appiah suggests, we identify and constitute agents 
not only by our idealizations—the norms to which our 
agents ought conform—but by the gap between idealiza- 
tion and reality, norms and conformance, map and ter-
ritory. Appiah’s framework locates theoretical agency in 
error, imperfect rationality, and normative deviance.
TO ERR, IS, AFTER ALL, HUMAN, but Appiah’s account of the 
interplay between agency, normativity, and error opens 
fascinating views of economic theory that, unfortunately, 
he leaves largely unexplored.⁵ As If lacks an explicit 
articulation of the theoretical complement to Ramsey’s 
idealization of perfect rationality: Appiah argues that 
such a theory, which would idealize away the content of 
economic agents’ beliefs and preferences to explain the 
causal powers of their deviations from rationality, is nec-
essary, but fails to himself supply it.
Historically, this theory was produced by Ramsey’s col-
league and friend, John Maynard Keynes. Ramsey had 
originally formulated his theory of probability in response 
to Keynes’ Treatise on Probability, and Keynes’ magnum 
opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money, in turn places at its textual and theoretical center 
a theory of how economic agents recognize but deviate 
from normative rationality. Of orthodox economics, 
Keynes writes:
At any given time facts and expectations were assumed 
to be given in a definite and calculable form; and risks, 
of which, tho admitted, not much notice was taken, were  
supposed to be capable of an exact actuarial computa-
tion. The calculus of probability, tho mention of it was 
kept in the background, was supposed to be capable of 
reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as 
that of certainty itself.⁶
However, Keynes continues, the full assimilation of uncer- 
tainty to the structure of rational calculation is logically 
impossible. By uncertainty, Keynes did not mean “risky” 
games of roulette, life expectancy, and (to some extent) 
the weather—phenomena that are not certain but merely 
probable. Uncertainty instead refers to “the prospect of a 
European war…or the price of copper and the rate of inter- 
est twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new 
invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the 
social system in 1970.” Major political upheavals, future 
conditions of exchange, changes in the means of produc-
tion, and outcomes of the class struggle are all incalcula-
ble, hence unknowable, hence possible—and realizable in 
action, for it is precisely “human decisions affecting the 
future, whether personal or political or economic, [that] 
cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since 
the basis for making such calculations does not exist.”⁷
Nevertheless, “the necessity for action and for decision” 
in the market compels Keynesian economic actors to act 
“exactly as if we had behind us a good Benthamite calcu- 
lation of a series of prospective advantages and disad-
vantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, 
waiting to be summed.” Instead, economic actors 1) largely 
ignore future uncertainty, assuming that the present is a  
better guide to the future than they know it to be; 2) as- 
sume that the present state of opinion, expressed in prices 
and output, correctly sums up future prospects; and so 
3) fall back on the communal or conventional judgment 
of the market. Expectation under uncertainty is a social 
relation, explicitly mediated by the normative community 
Appiah posits as central to the construction of agency.
Moreover, in Keynes, it is the constitutive nature of error—
the impossibility of perfect rationality—to economic 
agency that subtends the crisis potential of capitalism: 
“a practical theory of future based on these principles…is 
subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of  
calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, sud-
denly breaks down.”⁸
As If instructs us that while we need idealized theories to 
understand and act upon the world, our theories and our 
communities define their agents where they leave open 
the possibility of non-ideality, the necessary deviation 
from normativity. For Keynes, this is in the figure of the 
investor, the actor who makes choices about the alloca-
tion of capital when adherence to rational calculability is 
impossible.⁹ For Marx, this is the proletariat, the subject 
of history and manifestation of agency.
The reason why we care about who gets to count as an 
economic agent isn’t that we have an abstract commit-
ment to a visibility politics of the oppressed. What really 
matters is that economic theory has an exhortative func-
tion; the erring capitalists and workers of Keynes and 
Marx are not just theoretical agents, but the intended 
audience for the General Theory and Capital’s calls to 
political action. Marx, of course, ultimately addresses 
his writing to the proletariat. Keynes, meanwhile, directs 
the Concluding Notes to his General Theory to “practical 
men…civil servants and politicians and even agitators” 
who might enact his prescriptions of countercyclical defi- 
cit spending and stock market reforms (the “euthanasia 
of the rentier”).¹⁰
However, As If fails to address a reader. Appiah is “inter-
ested in the role of untruth in thinking about reality, not 
in the usefulness of speaking untruths.” The distinction 
he intends is one between cases where the idealizer knows 
that what they are thinking is false and cases in which 
they are deceived, the difference between the necessity 
of idealization and the expediency of deception. But all 
communication is not deceit: As If leaves open the urgent 
question of what we talk about—and whom we talk to—
when we talk about ideals.
The norms that structure who counts as an agent are un- 
deniably political—questions of personhood, disenfranch- 
isement, and citizenship, in their broadest senses, which 
are expressed and negotiated in political discourse, 
institutional structures, material deprivation, and violent 
exclusion. As languages of agency, idealization and polit-
ical discourse alike are languages of counterfactuals: 
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they express what is not, but might be. “It’s only because 
we can understand what it would be for the world to be 
different from the way it is,” Appiah writes, “only because 
we have epistemic access to possible worlds, if you like—
that we can build idealizations.”
But politics is concerned not with false antecedents but 
their possible consequents. The untruths we tell about  
actuality matter less than the possibilities—and the actions 
necessary to achieve them—that they illuminate in our 
political futures. Debates in politics, unlike in political  
philosophy or academic economics, are not usually fought  
over alternate modeling assumptions. Conversely, the invo- 
cation of modeling assumptions in political discourse 
serves not as an opening of a conversation about economic 
theory, but as an implied commitment to political action.
Yet Appiah equivocates between these two senses of pos-
sibility, between what is a possible (but false) modeling 
assumption, and what is politically possible or attainable 
(but not yet realized) given our assumptions:
The questions are often complex, empirical, social 
scientific questions about human possibility: what 
changes … is it feasible to bring about, given the way 
people are psychologically, given the social structures 
in which they are embedded? But in all these domains, 
in taking something false for true, we are engaging in 
what is, at least from one angle, our most astonishing 
human capacity: the ability to access ways the world is 
not but might have been.
The problem behind Appiah’s equivocation is not just lin- 
guistic—we only have one word for possibility—but logical: 
expanding the boundaries of what is possible in our model 
will determine what we see as possible in our political 
futures, while stating a political possibility will necessarily 
carry with it an implicit idealized model. Speaking one 
untruth precludes speaking the other.
observed the corrosive drift of language around him: 
“The Third Reich coined only a very small number of words 
in its language, perhaps—indeed probably—none at all. 
But it changes the values of words and the frequency of  
their occurrence…and in the process steeps words and 
groups of words and sentence structures with its poison.”¹¹  
Commentators are self-righteously attentive to the per-
versions of language foisted on us by the Trump adminis-
tration, as if truth were a buoy to cling to. But in doing so, 
we have swapped out the political agents of our language 
and our economic theories for jurors, leaving only the 
incredulous epistemic possibility of a fact-finder. Is it 
possible that the inauguration audience was the larg- 
est ever? Is it possible that the wall can be built in a year?  
Is it possible that Uber will provide living wages? Is it 
possible that tariffs will bring back manufacturing jobs?
But the point of articulating an untruth in politics is not 
whether we believe it, but about what its effect is when 
spoken—who the audience is, and what possibilities they 
are urged to enact. Unlike Keynes and Marx, whose the-
ories ascribe theoretical agency to and demand political 
action from their audience, Trump’s untruths—to the extent  
that they can be constituted as a “theory”—address the 
working and middle classes, even as his policies are aimed  
to benefit the elite.
The language of political possibility is fragile, elusive in 
the best of times. It can sound wonkish, uncertain, or 
gullible. But at its most rhetorically powerful, program-
matic usage slips into another modal category: necessity. 
We speak untruths to compel action, and to compel it now: 
saying another world is possible means we need another 
world. As an accidental cartography of the truth and 
untruth that occupy our political attention, As If can help 
us understand how to recover a language of urgency in 
the possibilities that are left to us. Any political possibi- 
lity rests on a false representation of its subject, and 
Appiah is right to emphasize that shifting our normative 
constructions of agents in a community is what shifts the 
boundaries of the possible. We see this in movements for 
immigrants’ rights: the contestation of citizenship and 
community, “no borders, no walls” as possibility and as 
demand. We see it, too, in courtroom and workplace bat-
tles over what counts as work and who counts as a worker 
in an economy increasingly defined by subcontracting, 
the “gig economy,” and other structures both hostile to 
labor organizing and outside many worker protection laws.
The limits of As If are the limits of idealization. They are  
the limits of a political discourse in which truth evacuates  
possibility. Appiah asks of idealizations, “For what pur-
poses…?” We might ask this ourselves. For what purposes 
have we made a map of the territory if we don’t know 
where we can go?
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF POSSIBILITY  
in As If is happening today. Appiah notes that “our unhappy 
proliferation of ‘alternative facts’ is not what Vaihinger”—
or Appiah—“had in mind” in their thinking about useful  
untruths and idealizations. Nevertheless, As If’s language 
for describing idealization characterizes the language of  
the current moment: a strong notion of brute truth, a focus  
on identifying and adjudicating untruths. Alternative facts, 
fake news, post-truth politics; the words of our vigilance 
are drenched in truth, and the limits and aims of our 
political language have shifted accordingly. Our preoc-
cupation with truth, intended as a safeguard against 
Trump’s linguistic rot, has led inadvertently to a different 
sort of decay: the hollowing out of a political language of 
possibility, and of the awareness of the rhetorical func-
tions of idealization.
The pure possibility that has long characterized political 
rhetoric, both mainstream and radical—Yes We Can, A 
Future to Believe In, Another World is Possible—now 
sounds tone deaf. This is not about optimism. It is undeni- 
able that material realities in the current political moment 
have reduced what appears as immediately possible; 
what’s happening to political language reflects (and does 
not cause) what’s happening to politics, and to the most 
marginalized.
But something nonetheless changes in the political lan- 
guage of possibility when politics becomes about hard 
truths and untruths. In the Language of the Third Reich, 
the Jewish-turned-Protestant philologist Victor Klemperer 
IDEALIZATION AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE  
ALIKE ARE LANGUAGES OF COUNTERFACTUALS: 
THEY EXPRESS WHAT IS NOT, BUT MIGHT BE.
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Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded (Macmillan,  
1893), 169.
Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulation”, in Jean 
Baudrillard, Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 166-184.
Joan Robinson, a British post-Keynesian who attempted to  
assimilate aspects of Marx’s work into a Keynesian frame-
work (An Essay in Marxian Economics, 1942), is often  
quoted: “A model which took account of all the variegation 
of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale 
of one to one.” Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, 
London: Macmillan (1962), 33.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Interview with Kwame Anthony 
Appiah—Pt. III,” Interview by Daniel Kodsi, Oxford Review of 
Books, the-orb.org/2017/09/22/interview-with-kwame- 
anthony-appiah-pt-iii.
And, for that matter, sociopolitical structures. What, for in- 
stance, might this methodology tell us about Western con-
structions of gender and sexuality, if agency is coextensive  
with not just the acceptance of norms as binding but also 
with the inevitability of noncompliance? If a theory of law- 
breaking is constitutive of legal agents, what does this say 
about international law without enforcement mechanisms, 
or about the relationship between the racialized carceral 
subject and the citizen? Appiah briefly considers sexual ori-
entation and race as idealizations in As If (and at length in  
his Ethics of Identity), but does not explore the connection  
with his account of agency and normativity as explicitly as 
might be hoped. Appiah writes, “Simply believing there really 
are or really aren’t any homosexuals is not yet to have a 
moral belief.” What we are to do with this perspective—what 
expressing, individually or collectively, that there are, strictly 
speaking, no races or sexual orientations makes politically 
possible—is left (at least in As If) underdetermined.
John Maynard Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51, no. 2 (Feb. 1937): 213.
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money London: MacMillan & Co, Ltd., 1957, 162. 
Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 51, no. 2 (Feb. 1937): 215.
The worker is not afforded the same status: remarking upon 
the “actual behaviour of labour” in striking upon decreases 
in nominal wages but not in the cost of living (i.e. the distri- 
bution and not the level of real wages), Keynes writes, “It is 
fortunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are instinc- 
tively more reasonable economists than the classical school.” 
Workers’ strikes are taken not to be intentional economic 
action as such (“unconsciously, instinctively”) but as some-
thing of an empirical quirk.
The latter is explicitly intended to minimize the distortions  
in prices as expression of the collective judgment of agents 
in a state of uncertainty; that is, to bring the state of long-
term expectations closer to the idealization of rational choice.
Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich (Continuum, 
2006), 14.
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The Earth is squeezing us.  
I wish we were its wheat  
So we could die and live again.¹
OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF MONTHS, a narrow sliver of 
land in the eastern Mediterranean has transformed into 
a site of commemoration, resistance, and violence. Since 
March 30, Gazans have marched to the eastern edge of 
their territory—to an area no greater than eight-hundred 
meters in width, extending along the twenty-five-mile 
length of the Gaza Strip—to join the largest mass demon-
stration in Gaza since the late 1980s. Over ten thousand 
have participated in each of the weekly Friday protests; 
on May 14th, at the height of demonstrations, there were  
nearly forty-thousand Gazans in attendance. The protests  
coincide with the seventieth-anniversary of the Palestinian  
nakba, the expulsion of over seven-hundred thousand 
Palestinians from their land and homes in 1948. The rallies 
are an expression of defiance against what Palestinians 
call al-nakba al-mustamerra—the ongoing catastrophe—
particularly in Gaza, where multiple wars, a crippling siege, 
failing infrastructure, and political infighting have pushed  
nearly two million Palestinians closer and closer to the 
brink of societal collapse. And these past two months have  
themselves marked yet another chapter in the history of 
Palestinian catastrophe. Israeli soldiers have killed over 
one hundred twenty Palestinian civilians and wounded over  
thirteen thousand with live sniper ammunition, rubber 
bullets, and tear gas canisters.² The majority of those lucky 
enough to survive the impact of bullets will, accoring to 
the local health ministry, be left with lifelong disabilities.³
What has been nearly as troubling, though, is the extent 
to which these basic facts have been distorted to justify 
the use of deadly force. The Israeli government has claimed 
that the Islamist fundamentalist organization, Hamas, 
is behind the protests, using demonstrators as human 
shields and attempting to breach the Israeli fence.⁴ Israeli  
officials have similarly maintained that their soldiers are  
acting in self-defense—or, conversely, that the Palestinians 
who throw stones and makeshift explosive devices, burn 
tires and kites, and storm the fence constitute a threat to 
Israeli security. These activities, according to the Israeli 
government, are acts of war and free the military from 
the restrictions of human rights law.⁵
On further inspection, these justifications fall flat. While 
Hamas has indeed provided financial and organizational 
support to the demonstrators, the Great Return March 
has been led by a wide coalition of Palestinians from the 
beginning, including doctors, lawyers, university students 
and academics, civil society organizations, refugees, and 
families. Although Hamas has profited politically from 
the demonstrations, the movement has never “belonged” 
to them. To suggest otherwise, according to Asad Abu 
Sharekh, the spokesman for the march, “is Israel’s way to  
sabotage the idea of the march in order to justify its 
escalation against protesters.”⁶
Neither have protestors posed any significant danger 
to Israeli soldiers or civilians. Here, again, the evidence 
against the Israeli government is overwhelming: not a 
single Israeli has been physically harmed over the past 
two months.⁷ And at the very least, if Israeli soldiers are 
acting in self-defense, then they should theoretically in- 
jure or kill only those who constitute, by the state’s defi-
nition, a violent threat. This is especially true in Gaza, 
where the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) claims to have acted  
with super-human precision: its snipers, according to the 
army’s Twitter account, “know where every bullet landed.”⁸ 
Yet live fire has struck medical teams and ambulances.⁹ 
Snipers have shot elderly women and children.¹⁰ It is 
hard to see how any of these participants threatened the 
integrity of the Israeli state. The fact that the IDF main-
tains, despite much criticism, that they were confirmed 
threats is all the more troubling.
It is not only Israel, though, that has portrayed Palestinian  
protestors as a legitimate threat. The US government has 
justified the use of lethal force against demonstrators 
based on Israel’s right to “self-defense,” the same excuse 
used to justify Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria. 
The New York Times, too, has repeatedly misrepresented 
the protests, which it described as “armed clashes along 
the border.”¹¹ In the same sentence, the Times referred to 
both Palestinian protestors and the Iranian government 
as “threats” to Israel, collapsing the distinction between 
stones and nuclear weapons.¹²
There may be a number of reasons why this narrative—
that Gazans are violent and thus responsible for their own  
deaths—continues to carry weight. The influence of the 
Israel lobby on American politics and media coverage may 
certainly be one of them. But one of the simplest expla-
nations might also be one of the best: the Israeli govern- 
ment has not only twisted the facts, but has helped to 
prevent the truth from leaking out. Journalists on the front- 
lines in Gaza—those who are positioned to provide the 
best coverage of the protests—have been specifically tar-
geted by the IDF. Though they were wearing helmets and 
bulletproof jackets, marked with “PRESS” in bold letters, 
at least twenty-two Palestinian reporters were struck by 
live sniper ammunition between March 30th and May 
21st. Two have died from their wounds.¹³ According to the 
Forum of Palestinian Journalists, the total number of 
journalists injured at the protests has passed 175.¹⁴ The 
Israeli parliament has been considering legislation that 
would ban journalists from photographing on-duty IDF 
soldiers, where violations would be punishable with up 
to ten years in prison.¹⁵ The less the outside world knows 
about the protests in Gaza, the Israeli government seems 
to believe, the better.
IT IS REGRETTABLY FITTING THAT on the anniversary of the  
Palestinian nakba, the narrative of the protests in Gaza 
is distorted and silenced. Over the past seventy years, 
history itself—its use, abuse, and erasure—has played an 
important role in helping to prolong the nakba. Indeed, 
part of the original catastrophe was the destruction and 
scattering of vast amounts of Palestinian history. As the 
historian Rashid Khalidi points out, between 1947 and 
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1949, “more than half of the Arab population of Palestine 
fled or were driven from their homes…while the two cities 
in Palestine with the largest Arab populations, Jaffa and 
Haifa, were ethnically cleansed of most Arabs.”¹⁶ This 
forced removal meant that the majority of privately-held 
historical documents were lost or destroyed in the years 
following the nakba. As a result, there is a dire shortage 
of printed material to document the history of pre-1948 
Palestine. Even with the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state, any central archive would necessarily 
be a fragmentary collection.
Not all of the documents in question are exactly lost, how- 
ever. Much of the historical material from private Pales-
tinian collections that survived 1948 was collected and 
kept classified in the Israeli State Archives. Until the 
1980s—when the public was granted access to this mate-
rial, inaugurating a new era of Israeli revisionist history— 
there could be no challenge to the Israeli nationalist myths  
that pervaded the historiography and misrepresented 
both the nakba and the subsequent years of military rule. 
Even today, the nakba is largely absent from public dis-
course in Israel, and the state maintains the authority to 
punish those who commemorate it.¹⁷
The impact of these restrictions, though, is not limited 
to historians. As the Palestinian-American journalist 
Ramzy Baroud argues, part of the trauma of the ongoing 
nakba for Palestinians is the continued suppression of 
their own history. In a recent op-ed for The Independent, 
Baroud recalls a particularly vivid memory from his early 
life in a Gaza refugee camp. During the First Intifada, 
Israeli soldiers entered the camp and killed four youth, 
including one of Baroud’s close childhood friends. But what 
struck him most severely was the silence in the wake of 
these deaths. “Once the young men were buried,” Baroud 
remembers, “my father fiddled hopelessly with the radio, 
trying to find any news broadcast, anywhere, that reported 
on the terrible events that took place in our camp on that 
day. No one did.”¹⁸ This was the same silence that accom-
panied the destruction of his grandfather’s village, Beit 
Daras, in 1948. And, Baroud soon realized, this was a 
silence familiar to Palestinians everywhere, whose stories  
had been ignored or twisted, and ultimately expunged 
from the historical record.
Baroud, the editor of the Palestine Chronicle, a former 
managing editor at the Middle East Eye and Al Jazeera 
Online, and a frequent contributor to a host of English-
language publications, describes his work as an author 
and a journalist as giving voice to those Palestinians who 
have been “deliberately muted.” His fourth and latest book— 
The Last Earth: A Palestinian Story—is a worthy addition 
to this project. The Last Earth is, as Baroud calls it, a 
“people’s history,” an account of the nakba and its after-
math told from the perspective of those who experienced 
it. This is not a conventional work of history: there is little 
in the way of historical analysis or explicit argumentation. 
Rather, it is the logical extension of Baroud’s work as a  
journalist. His goal is to allow Palestinians to speak for 
themselves, to narrate their own histories, and in so doing, 
to show “ordinary people as active agents in shaping the 
present and future.”¹⁹ The Last Earth, then, is a testament 
to the importance of oral tradition: although physical 
records have been lost, Palestinian history will endure as 
long as there are those to remember and retell it.
Along with a team of fellow researchers and journalists, 
Baroud spent the past three years reaching out to Palesti-
nians across the world through social media and other 
online platforms, sorting through hundreds of potential 
candidates, and interviewing a final fifty to gather the 
stories presented in this book. The final product reflects 
this diversity of time and place: in nine chapters, we 
move between Gaza and Australia, Jenin and Syria, al- 
Mujaydil and Lebanon; from the Great Revolt of 1936 to 
Black September in 1970, from the nakba of 1948 to the 
Second Intifada in 2002, and from the naksa of 1967 to 
the Syrian war in 2015.
It might seem that such a wide scope would belie Baroud’s 
larger aim in The Last Earth—to provide “a unified perspec- 
tive on Palestinian identity in modern times.” Yet Baroud 
manages to weave these seemingly disparate stories into 
a distinct narrative. Despite everything that serves to 
divide Palestinians from each other—walls, fences, bor-
ders, political factionalism and military force, exile and 
diaspora—Baroud shows that their individual histories are 
linked by a common root and a multitude of shared expe-
riences. All of the Palestinians in The Last Earth carry 
the nakba of 1948 with them, through memories of lost 
villages, the stories of parents and grandparents, or even 
a family memento—a key, for example, to a house that 
has long been destroyed. But this is not merely an histor-
ical awareness: they all remain affected by that original 
catastrophe. Even for those in the diaspora, as illustrated 
by the stories in The Last Earth, the mere fact of being 
Palestinian can be a burden. It is the Palestinian school-
child who, when invited to share the story of her family’s 
emigration to Australia, is informed by her teacher that 
“there [is] no such thing as Palestine.” It is the Palestinian 
refugee in Syria who, while fleeing his country for Turkey, 
learns to deny his identity because Palestinians are 
“thrown in Turkish jails for significantly longer durations 
than their Syrian counterparts.” It is the granddaughter of 
a Palestinian who carries with her a “nagging sadness”—a 
guilt for being able to “forget [her] people’s suffering.”
For those living in Gaza and the West Bank, however, the 
ongoing nakba manifests itself on a daily basis. Here, to 
be Palestinian is to be persecuted not only by Israel and 
its Western allies, but even by the Palestinian Authority, 
whose security forces serve as “a line of defense for the  
Israeli army,” enter the homes of Palestinians, and “[demand] 
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confessions and [levy] threats.” To be Palestinian is to 
live under military occupation—particularly for those who 
have known nothing else. The younger Palestinians in 
The Last Earth grow up under the constant watch of the  
Israeli military establishment, and their attitudes towards  
Israel are shaped by their interactions with soldiers. Hana  
Shalabi, the infamous Palestinian hunger striker, would 
often “hear of ‘the Jews’ [as a young girl] but would hardly 
ever see them.” Her decision to support the First Intifada, 
then, is not a result of a deep-seated hatred of Jews, but 
rather a reaction to the murder of a neighbor by Israeli 
soldiers, “ugly, cruel men who spoke a strange language 
and wore military uniforms.”
To be Palestinian, as exemplified by Shalabi, is also to 
be part of a long tradition of resistance. Baroud, however, 
steers clear of glorifying his subjects: the Palestinians in 
The Last Earth resist desperately, driven by the need to 
regain a sense of agency. Baroud captures the humiliation 
and despair that push those living under military occupa-
tion, particularly young men, towards violence. But he  
does so without endorsing it—if anything, he emphasizes 
its consequences. It is Shalabi’s brother, Samir, who de- 
cides to place a bomb in the middle of a street to ambush  
an Israeli military convoy, and who is later killed by Israeli  
soldiers while attempting to carry out a suicide attack. 
But it is Shalabi who bears the punishment for her broth-
er’s actions: suspected of planning to avenge Samir’s 
death, she is kept in administrative detention for twenty- 
five months, and subjected to physical violence, sexual 
abuse, and psychological torture. When she is arrested 
for the second time, just months after being released, 
and assaulted with even greater brutality, she begins her 
hunger strike:
[A]s Hana grew physically weaker, her resolve grew 
stronger. Her gums swelled by day twenty. Her hair fell 
out by day thirty-five. And only when blood began to 
pour from her nose was she taken to a Haifa hospital…
[it was] a sign that her death was imminent.
Shalabi’s story is certainly a testament to the human capa- 
city for nonviolent resistance. But it also suggests that 
under certain conditions of oppression, a desire for jus- 
tice can override our most basic instincts for survival. Here, 
there is no difference between life and death—they are, as  
a protestor in Gaza recently affirmed, the “same thing.”²⁰
AS LONG AS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT distorts the narra-
tive of the protests, silences Palestinian journalists, and 
forbids public discussion of Palestinian history, simply 
giving Palestinians a platform to retell their own histo-
ries is a necessarily political act. It is to demonstrate, as 
Baroud has recently argued, that Palestinians are capa-
ble of “making decisions independent from Palestinian 
factions.”²¹ The fact, too, that Baroud relies on oral 
tradition is welcome: even Israel’s most important revi-
sionist historians have largely restricted themselves to 
Israeli sources, ignoring the potential of oral testimony. 
But Baroud’s deeper contribution is to show that despite 
the lack of recorded Palestinian history—or, perhaps, 
because of its absence—Palestinians are committed to 
documenting it themselves.
In The Last Earth, we learn of Salim, a young Palestinian 
living in Gaza during the Suez War, who is compelled 
to follow the Israeli Army in “their every move” and 
write “in his journal everything he saw and heard.” Salim 
understands the importance of physical documenta-
tion: it does not matter whether he can make sense 
of the events he witnesses on his own, so long as he 
can set everything down in ink. There is also Kamal, a 
Palestinian youth detained in an Israeli military prison 
during the First Intifada. Because he recognizes the 
fragility of his own story, Kamal carves the names of his 
family members into the cell walls, setting in stone “all 
that was certain [to him].” And there is Ali, a father in 
search of his daughter, lost amidst the chaos of the ongo-
ing war in Syria. With Baroud’s help, Ali tries to reach 
his daughter through the Red Cross, writing a series of 
letters that will most likely never reach their intended 
recipient. If he dies before he reaches her, Ali instructs 
his daughter, she should pass on his story to her siblings 
and children—the story of a Palestinian Bedouin, “born in 
a world that had no place for poor people or wanderers.”
Ali’s story illustrates the larger point that in The Last 
Earth, Palestinian history is confined to family history. 
The younger generations learn the history of the nakba 
through the stories of their parents and grandparents. 
Baroud succeeds not merely by capturing these in print, 
but by elevating family history as a genre of historical 
narrative. These stories often convey Palestinian history 
as well as, if not better than, the traditional academic 
accounts. A number of historians, for example, have writ-
ten extensively about the phenomenon of Palestinian land  
loss during the 1930s and the subsequent urbanization of 
the Palestinian peasantry. But to hear the stories of these 
fellahin (tillers, farmers) from their sons and daughters— 
to learn of their struggle to “fend off the constant attempts  
of the large clans to deprive [them] of [their] land and strip  
[them] of what was rightfully [theirs]”—is to grasp this 
history as a lived experience. So too might we read scho-
larly accounts of Jamal Abdel Nasser’s rise to power in 
Egypt and appreciate its importance in the context of 
Palestinian liberation struggle. But it is more meaningful, 
and perhaps more memorable, to meet those Palestinian 
refugees who placed such hopes in this Egyptian leader 
that they named their sons Jamal in his honor.
These family histories also help us understand the nakba 
as a constantly unfolding catastrophe: The Last Earth is  
a tragedy in multiple acts, seen through the eyes of three  
generations of Palestinians. This is, too, where Baroud 
makes his largest historiographical contribution. Although  
he is not the first to record Palestinian stories, most his- 
torians and anthropologists have either focused exclu-
sively on gathering oral histories from the pre-1948 period 
or have restricted themselves to a specific historical event 
or topic in the post-1948 era.²² In The Last Earth, however,  
by zooming in on a single family unit, it becomes clear 
how al-nakba al-mustamera extends across time—not, as 
we might assume, in a linear fashion. To take the Lubani 
family as an example: in the first generation, there is 
Mohammed, a “well-regarded government employee” 
from a small Palestinian village. In 1948, when his village 
is destroyed, he escapes with family to a refugee camp 
near Damascus, where he is reduced to shoveling cow 
dung for a living. Despite the upheaval of his childhood, 
Mohammed’s son, Jamal, manages to gain a respected 
position as a teacher in an UNRWA school. Yet they are  
still Palestinian refugees, living in a country where their  
security and stability is necessarily tenuous. So when 
their camp is besieged by Syrian government forces, 
Jamal’s son is forced to flee his home, following in his  
grandfather’s footsteps. These “echoes of history,” as  
Baroud puts it, affirm the reality of nakba for Palestinians  
today, who may be affected by it as directly and as terri-
bly as their grandparents. They suggest that the adversity 
Palestinians have faced and continue to face is, in fact, 
linked to that first catastrophe. These historical links, in 
turn, help us understand the ways in which the commem-
oration of the seventieth anniversary of 1948 is simulta-
neously a protest against current injustice.
IT MIGHT SEEM ODD, given Baroud’s focus on the nakba and  
Palestinian identity, that The Last Earth begins outside 
Palestine—in a refugee camp in Syria, present day, with 
the story of a third-generation Palestinian. Though he 
identifies as Palestinian, Khaled is born in Yarmouk and 
has known nothing else. For him, Palestine only exists  
“in books, or as the tattered map in his family’s living 
room, and in old fables conveyed by long-dead grandpar-
ents.” Amidst the violence of the Syrian crisis, Khaled 
escapes from Yarmouk. But unlike his grandfather’s ex- 
pulsion, nearly seventy years before, Khaled’s exile is not 
an exclusively Palestinian catastrophe. As he makes his 
way towards western Europe, Khaled is accompanied by 
refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, all 
of whom are fleeing war and desolation, and who carry 
on with a dogged persistence despite the many obstacles. 
Perhaps, then, Baroud wants us to see the Palestinian 
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story as a universal one—a story shared by the millions of 
refugees and exiles that wander the earth. If we are moved 
by these stories of hardship, Baroud seems to suggest, 
then Palestinians cannot be excluded from our sympa-
thy. And if we agree that all people deserve a permanent 
home—a “last earth”—then we cannot fail to extend this 
right to Palestinians.
But if The Last Earth begins by universalizing the Pales-
tinian struggle, then the end reminds us that the nakba 
occupies a distinct place in the human narrative of exile 
and loss. “The Last Sky”, the eighth chapter of the book, 
is the story of Leila, also a third-generation Palestinian. 
Yet Leila’s family has seemingly managed to escape the 
legacy of 1948. Born in Saudi Arabia, she spends her 
childhood in Jordan, where her Western-educated parents  
operate a successful business. Palestine is peripheral to  
her existence: “there did not seem to be a need to men-
tion their refugee status, or include Palestine into every-
day discussions…the Nakba was rarely invoked at the 
dinner table or at family gatherings.”
When the Syrian crisis erupts in 2015, Leila is moved by  
the images of refugees crowding into small boats, des- 
perately seeking an escape from their war-ravaged homes.  
Armed with a medical degree and a doctorate in psycho- 
logy, she travels to an island in Mediterranean to volun-
teer at a refugee center, assigned to help “dejected refu-
gees negotiate their pain and cope with their traumas.” 
But when she arrives, she is informed that there are no 
Syrians present. Here, there are only Palestinian refu-
gees: men, women, and children who have fled camps in 
Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon, and are now stranded in the 
middle of the sea. Though Leila was motivated by a basic 
human desire—an urge to help end suffering—her journey 
brought her back to Palestine. On average, she remembers, 
refugees live in exile for seventeen years; yet for these 
Palestinians, “exile did not have a time limit.” If, Leila 
IF THE LAST EARTH BEGINS BY UNIVERSALIZING 
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wonders, we hope that Syrians might someday return to  
Syria, then for these refugees, “why not to Palestine? Why 
never Palestine?”
Leila’s story reminds us that the deeper we are willing to 
look, the more we realize that our contemporary crises are  
inextricably connected to the nakba, in both its past and 
present forms. We should care about Palestine because  
we believe that all people are deserving of certain uni-
versal rights: the right to return to one’s homeland, to be 
equal under the law, to be secure on one’s own property, 
to protest without risking death. But we cannot ignore the  
fact that the nakba is exceptional in its scope—that this 
seventy-year saga is, in its historical specificity, particu-
larly tragic. As the late Edward Said argued nearly twenty 
years ago, any permanent resolution to the nakba cannot 
require Palestinians to “forget and renounce [their] his-
tory of loss, dispossessed by the very people who taught 
everyone the importance of not forgetting the past.”²³ The  
stories collected in The Last Earth serve as evidence of 
this history of loss and resistance, a history that contin-
ues to unfold today. But they also stand as a testament 
to the power of history itself, of the need to recount the 
past, as part of that struggle. They remind us that yes, 
this nakba must end; but so too must it be remembered.
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